Analysing the Hate Speech Within the Framework of Political Discourse

Aleksandar Stevanović

doi:10.47152/ziksi2023014

Authors

Aleksandar Stevanović Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade, Serbia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47152/ziksi2023014

Keywords:

hate speech, political speech, freedom of expression

Abstract

The author considers hate speech within the broader context of the right to freedom of expression with specific reference to political speech. The European Court of Human Rights, in its jurisprudence, takes the stance that the protections for freedom of expression extend to content that might be offensive, shocking, and disturbing to someone. It is also well accepted in comparative case law and doctrine that political speech has a privileged position in terms of legal protection when it comes to a greater degree of criticism. On the other hand, it is extremely important to protect individuals and collectives from exposure to hate speech since it does not achieve the objectives of the right to freedom of expression in any way. However, it is clear at first glance that in a large number of cases, there is an intertwining of hate speech with speech to which the law provides legal protection. Content related to racial, negationism, revisionism, religious, ethnic, etc. issues is a legitimate and integral part of political discourse, while a very small space separates them from slipping into the field of hate speech. Although the historical, cultural, sociological, and psychological context is important for the qualification of certain content as hate speech, the author seeks to analyze the basics of the definition of hate speech through a comparative legal approach (UN and other international and regional organizations) to offer a framework for distinguishing hate speech from other permitted content which would be applicable in general, appreciating all the possible variables that affect the qualification of hate speech.

References

Austin, J. L. (2013). Performative utterances. In The semantics–pragmatics boundary in philosophy (p. 21).

Barendt, E. (2009). Freedom of speech. Oxford University Press.

Barendt, E. (2019). What is the harm of hate speech? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 22, 539–553. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10002-0

Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).

Boucher v. R, 2 DLR 369 (1951).

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444.

BVerfGE, 198 (1958).

BVerfGE, 241, 266 (1994).

Ćirić, J. (2006). Govor mržnje. Revija za kriminologiju i krivično pravo, 3, 2006.

Ćirić, J. (2015). Idealni zakoni i nesavesni pravnici. Nauka, bezbednost, policija, 20, 55–69. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5937/NBP1502055C

Criminal Code (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, Nos. 85/2005, 88/2005 – amnd., 107/2005 – amnd., 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012, 104/2013, 108/2014, 94/2016, 35/2019).

Emerson, T. I. (1962). Toward a general theory of the First Amendment. Yale Law Journal, 72, 877–956. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/794655

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950).

Foucault, M. (1971). Orders of discourse. Social Science Information, 10(2), 7–30. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847101000201

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

Herceg Pakšić, B. (2017). Tvorba novih standarda u slučajevima teških oblika govora mržnje: Negiranje genocida pred Europskim sudom za ljudska prava. Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 67(2), 229–253.

Howard, J. W. (2019). Free speech and hate speech. Annual Review of Political Science, 22, 93–109. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051517-012343

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).

Josip Šimunić v. Croatia, Application No. 20373/17.