Zbornik Instituta za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja
2006
/ Vol. XXV / 1-2 / 63-91
Originalni naučni rad
UDK: 343.97:343.341
Aleksandra
Bulatović
Institute
of Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade
This paper is presenting
concepts of resentment defined within the wide scope of feelings such as
bitterness, disliking, jealousy, envy, etc., in the context of ongoing
international and national efforts to conceive an adequate response to
terrorist attacks and fear from terrorism. Although there is a lack of
agreement between scholars and policy-makers marking
the contemporary discourse in relation to determination whether resentment is
the cause or it is the consequence of terrorism, resentment is typically
referred to as the key concept to understand
terrorism. By outlining several different approaches to resentment concept
frameworks, author is trying to point out that in research oriented towards
phenomenon of terrorism and designing of efficient and sustainable
anti-terrorist policy, multidisciplinary approach is needed.
KEY WORDS: terrorism / resentment /
social relationships / policy
High-profile terrorist incidents,
such as the event of 9/11, lead to attempts by national governments and
international governing bodies to re-direct efforts against terrorism in
function of political objectives.
Sociologists have, by and large,
neglected the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism.
The history of terrorism and counter-terrorism as
topics of sociological reflection is straightforward. Until recently very few
scholarly studies of terrorism and related issues had been conducted in the
sociological community (Beck, U., 2002; Deflem, M.,
1997; Etzioni, A., 2002; Webb, 2002). Most terrorism-related research was
conducted in other social sciences, especially political science, international
studies, and law. Social control and counter-terrorism
are complex realities, comprised of a multitude of dimensions which are not
necessarily in tune with one another.
Continued relevance that terrorism
may be expected to have in our era should stimulate the development of new
sociological ideas. Political scientists have focused on the relationship
between terrorism and political rights and on policies against terrorism in
relation to foreign policy. Terrorism has intellectually also connected with
the interests of international studies scholars, who have investigated
terrorism and counter-terrorism in terms of the
manifold interconnections between nations and other localities Scholars of law,
finally, have approached problems of terrorism and counter-terrorism
in the specialty areas of international law and criminal law. There is no doubt
that insights on terrorism in these social-science disciplines are highly
relevant, but a distinctive tradition of a sociology of terrorism is sadly
missing, despite the occasional exceptions (Gibbs, J. P., 1989).
Terrorism scholarship also comprises
the study of counter-terrorism, defined as the whole
of policies and practices responding to terrorism. Counter- terrorism, however,
has been relatively much less addressed than terrorism, mirroring a
differential concern related to power and authority which sociologists have
often noted. The existing literature focuses on counter- terrorism mostly as
one aspect of a broader focus in terms of national legislation and
international policy. Whatever it’s causes, the relative neglect of research on
the institutional dimensions of counter-terrorism has de facto led to an important omission in
scholarship.
The aim of this paper has been less
to provide definite answers than to introduce an intellectual scaffolding with
which to tentatively challenge rigidness some scholarships have towards
combining disparate disciplines as at this time we might do well to learn from
our neighbouring academic fellows. Perhaps, it is
even as ambitious as to instigate more enthusiastic approach in theoretical
correlations among disciplines in order to be able to
provide comprehensive answer to the issue raised with
the title of this paper. We would do well not to close the door in face of the
unfamiliar; let us embrace it instead as the fresh hope, instilled in a
seemingly hopeless situation that permits a possibility for change (Fisher, R.,
1996; Cohen, R., 1996; Hopmann, T. P., 1995). There is an obvious practical
dimension in such intellectual effort - in the context of policy making, models
created by intellectual efforts might provide policy makers with some feeling
for the implications of various policy options. Just how much we can actually apply scientific discovery and mathematical models
to political theory, or psychological studies to international relations and
fight against terrorism, is not clear. However, an introduction of fresh
thought is always a hope for a brighter future. If there is a chance for a more
stable and equitable state of affairs in the world
threatened by growing terrorist violence, in order to
provide redefinition of current strategies, scholars should jump at the
occasion to explore its possibilities. Critical thinking and interdisciplinary
research can be helpful in the development of new frameworks for
internationally adopted approach to promote lasting
success. Continued improvement in the practice of dealing with terrorism must
always be sought.
The
United States has based it’s National Strategy to Combat Terrorism on several steps:
1.
Defeat terrorists and their organizations:
i.
Identify terrorists and terrorist
organizations.
ii.
Locate terrorists and their organizations.
iii.
Destroy terrorists and their
organizations.
2.
Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to
terrorists;
i.
End the state sponsorship of terrorism.
ii.
Establish and maintain an international
standard of accountability with regard to combating
terrorism.
iii.
Strengthen and sustain the international
effort to fight terrorism.
iv.
Working with willing and able states.
v.
Enabling weak states.
vi.
Persuading reluctant states.
vii.
Compelling unwilling states.
viii.
Interdict and disrupt material support for
terrorists.
ix.
Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and
havens.
3.
Diminishing the underlying conditions that
terrorists seek to exploit:
i.
Partner with the international community
to strengthen weak states and prevent (re)emergence of terrorism.
ii.
Win the war of ideals.
4. Defend
United States citizens and interests at home and abroad:
i.
Implement the Nation Strategy for Homeland
Security.
ii.
Attain domain awareness.
iii.
Enhance measures to ensure the integrity,
reliability, and availability of critical physical and information-based
infrastructures at home and abroad.
iv.
Integrate measures to protect U.S.
citizens abroad.
v.
Ensure an integrated incident management
capability.
Operative definition of terrorism in
the United States foreign policy is framed by Federal Criminal Code. Chapter
113b of Part I of Title 18 of the Code defines terrorism and lists the crimes
associated with terrorism. In Section 2331 of Chapter 113b, terrorism is
defined as:
“(...) activities that involve
violent (...) or life-threatening acts (...) that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State and (...) appear to be
intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and (...) if domestic (...) occur primarily
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (...) if international
(...)occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
(...)”.
Although there is no
one international definition of terrorism accepted, it appears it would
not be a controversial idea to define terrorism is an
act of openly voiced antagonism, with developed resonance in use of aggression,
deception and coercion.
In the wake of the 11 March 2004
Madrid train bombing, Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, said,
“It is clear that force alone cannot win the fight against terrorism.” Prodi
was hardly he first continental leader to implicitly criticize United States
policy as short-sight and to suggest that there are clear and compelling
alternatives to America’s strategy in the war on terror. Soon after 9/11
itself, French Priminister Lionel Jospin traced
terrorist acts to “tension, frustration, antiradicalism,” which in turn “are
linked o inequality,” which would have to e addressed. In 2002, France’s
foreign minister famously termed US policy toward terrorism “simplistic”
precisely because it did not look to root causes, the situations, poverty,
injustice. Norway’s Primeminister, Kjell Bondevik,
insisted that “fighting terrorism should be about more than using your military
and freezing finances,” and convened two international conferences on the root
causes of terrorism in 2003.
Prominent British author Mary Kaldor
is among scholars who have criticised the “War on
Terrorism” as counterproductive. She believes the problem is broader than this
and that we should be worried about is the rise of extremist religious and
nationalist/ethnic networks, composed of both state and non-state actors, who
deliberately inflict large-scale violence against civilians (genocide,
massacres, population displacement, communal riots, suicide bombers) and who
are often engaged in all kinds of illicit activities (drug trade, human
trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms sales, and so on). Although most
public attention is focused on Islamic groups, this phenomenon can be found in
all major world religions (Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist) and also among many national or ethnic groups. According to
Kaldor, a balanced model of response to terrorism and international violence by
utilizing non-military as well as military tools. Non- military tools are the
following:
(i)
Education, as universal primary education
would be very important in reducing the incentive to send children to religious
schools. Education of girls is especially important. Above all, the most
important challenge is cognitive; how to take seriously the principle that all
human beings are equal.
(ii)
Media, as there needs to be much greater
investment in global public (but not state) radio and TV. Independent community
radio is especially important in countering extremist propaganda.
(iii)
Welfare, as the decline in social services has provided openings for humanitarian NGOs who
also bring with them a political message.
(iv)
Jobs, as unemployed or criminalized young
men are the main breeding ground for these ideologies. Development needs to
give priority to legitimate ways for these young people to make a living. Above
all, the most important challenge is cognitive; how to take seriously the
principle that all human beings are equal (Kaldor, M., 2006),
Neil J. Kressel thinks that study of
international conflict must go beyond “the psychology of attitudes,
perceptions, and group dynamics,” he also discusses how these latter components
must nonetheless be included in the analysis and balanced equally among the
economic, military. (Kressel, N.J. ,2002).
Diane Perlman claims we need to
replace war with “metaforce” - complex strategies
that combine non-violent forms of force including economic, educational,
political, psychological, social, moral, spiritual, and physical forms of
force. She suggests systematic strategies, including reducing the opponent's
fear, avoiding cornering the opponent, avoiding retaliating, satisfying just
grievances, understanding the meaning of their attack, removing pressures,
using mediators, designing win-win solutions, etc. including some harsher
non-violent approaches when the more positive ones don't work. If we are to
prevent the spiral of terrorist violence, we need to move into a post-military
paradigm as other options - negotiations and conflict resolution seem ineffective
in dealing with brutal regimes (Perlman, D., 2006).
Political science must be at least
partially inclusive of psychological exploration, for “all social behaviour,” Talcott Parsons writes, “including the
‘policies’ of the most complex collectivities like nation-states, is ultimately
the behaviour of human beings” (Parsons, T., 1978).
The fundamentals of basic human relations provide initial footing to those
international, which can then be understandable in terms of the motivation of
“unique individuals, albeit perhaps millions of them.
As contemporary international order
is conceived on the idea that “joint security can be ensured only by
cooperative efforts to advance their common interests”, one may ask
herself/himself if it is possible to reach sustainable agreement upon primary
issues only after finding an answer to the question: What is the meaning of
terrorist attacks?
Nothing is more telling about the
terrorist attacks in the United States than the nature of their targets. The
Twin Towers in New York City represented the future, modernity, America’s
optimistic outlook of the world and, more recently, of globalization. The
terrorist attacks constitute a direct hit against those values, which is the
main reason why the whole Western world immediately rallied in support. But
that’s not the whole story. Many people around the world outside the
traditionally defined Western nations showed profound consternation, but others
clearly did not. Many citizens of Third World nations did not jump out in
solidarity with America and most of those governments, even when outwardly
supportive, were less than wholeheartedly committed to their words.
In order to analyse
the nature of the responses, for or against supporting the United States, and
explore their meaning, we need to focus on the elemental role of resentment -
re-thinking resentment as a cause and/or consequence of terrorism explored in
this paper is aimed at to be the base on examining possibilities for
“empathetic understanding” among individuals to be used as “domain of validity”
for reaching mutually acceptable solutions to be found in order for there to be
any sustainable approach to deal with terrorism. The religious motivation of
the terrorist is transparent and, on its own terms, irrefutable, since by definition its sacred inspiration and goal are exempt
from all forms of human inquiry; its sanctions transcend all worldly
jurisdiction, descending from a hieratic point of reference beyond the pale of
human tribunals. Pre- or post- political in the sense of being unavailable to worldly negotiation, its violence is sacred in all that the
latter term denotes as absolute, beyond appeal, unanswerable to human reason.
Seen from afar, many observers
thought that the attacks, as bloody and heinous as they might be, were
justified. Their views ranged from the specific to the abstract, but all
coincided in at least one factor: they evidenced a profound resentment, if not hatred,
against the United States. What these observations have in common is that they
show a deep misunderstanding of the United States, as well as resentment
against it. It is needless to argue
that those positions immediately led to a very peculiar form of moral
relativism. Terrorism is to be condemned, many of them said, but sometimes it
may be justified.
Terrorism has as its prime objective
not only to destroy and demoralize, but also to foster a sense of chaos. It
seeks to destroy the spine of a society by undermining its values and
generating forces willing to sacrifice its very democratic nature in order to confront the common enemy. In this sense, as Bin
Laden’s statements exemplify, the terrorists’ main aim is political: they use
terror to advance a cause. In this, counter to conventional wisdom, terrorists
are absolutely rational: they know what the want and
have found a way to advance their interests. What these terrorists may not have
counted on is that their own front is not unanimous about their cause. The deep
social divisions that are obvious in places such as Algeria, but also in Egypt,
are at least as profound as those in Western nations. Given this, it is
critical to fight terrorism with weapons that could ultimately defeat it,
rather than running the risk of further nurturing it with the wrong measures.
The problems of open and democratic
societies are not new. Decades ago, an eminent philosopher, Karl Popper, wrote
an exceptional essay about the unique difficulties that liberal societies
confront (Popper, K., 1995). In The Open
Society and its Enemies, Popper argued that in liberal societies there are
always remnants of the tribalism from which they come and that the shock of
transition to modern society frequently creates reactionary movements that
attempt to return to their origins. Modernity and tribalism thus enter into conflict, each trying to have its way. The
fanaticism that motivates the terrorist may be explained by these tensions.
What 9/11 proves is that these fights can be extremely bloody and violent.
Self-effacement as a tactic is a
recipe for conformity, such as the underground man exhibits in his
irreproachable dress code, and the terrorists in theirs. However, its pressures
can also, and of necessity, result in eruptions of incivility, such as the
underground man recalls in dealing nastily with his clients as a petty
bureaucrat. In the desacralised, secularised
West, we regularly tend to write off the terrorists as religious fanatics whose
motivations are alien to our culture.
Uniquely or narrowly religious
explanations do not suffice, as if cognitive mastery were achieved by
portraying religion as the other and enemy of rationality and civil society.
This is a view stance advocated in the contemporary
academic discourse by some authors, whose only point of agreement, perhaps, is
the need to expel religion from the councils of those bent on a scientific
understanding of human experience. Yet mainstream Islam has unequivocally
denounced the events of September 11. The political leader of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, President Khatami, has dissociated his religion from such
terrorism by labelling it, at a speech at the UN in January 2002, as the work
of nihilists with whom no culture can find common ground.
It appears that, in this context, we
should think of how to respond anthropologically, dispassionately and
scientifically, to the cognitive imperative implied by the Roman adage homo sum et nihil humani alienum
puto, which remains axiomatic for all inter-human inquiry? In other words,
more in line with Friedrich Nietzsche's own phrasing, we should consider how to
understand what is all-too-human about this exercise of
apocalyptic violence in its appeal to hieratic and unanswerable transcendence.
Resentment as a structural concept is
a powerful tool for understanding human relations. As an affect,
a personal experience, it has a mostly negative valence; like envy, it is what we deplore on the part of
others, of the losers in a competition we see as free, fair, and open. Within
the global economic system - and the 9/11 events establish irrevocably that we
and our antagonists no less than our allies are in a one-world system, all of
whose economic and social machinery is in play - the only thing that is open to
appropriation on the part of some is the technological means of destroying the
game entirely, as justified by raising the stakes to an absolute, transcendent
level beyond this-worldly appeal. The very mobility of our technology, as it
miniaturizes the means of massive destructiveness, has the inconvenient and
ironic result of levelling the playing field, not in terms of economic
redistribution but solely in those of colossal destructiveness. In sum, we live
in a world, as Robert Kaplan, an author recently mostly associated with the
idea of existence of “an empire as the antidote to anarchy, policed by American
soldiers holding an assault rifle in one hand and offering candy bars with the
other”, sums it up, “that is closer and more dangerous than ever”. To the
extent that a “global village” is in the making, the same principles and
techniques of interpretation apply to its analysis as to the relatively more
circumscribed and self-contained communities that anthropologists have studied
in remoter and more traditional societies. Interpretation would focus on
sacrificial practices, as countless earlier studies have done.
The terrorist's vengeful strategy
reflects clearly enough the psychology of “loser wins”, whereby the winnings at
the table are discounted by the loser as worthless by contrast with gains to be
won at another, higher, ideal or transcendent level. The pathos of defeat in
this world is ennobled by appeal to an eternal, unworldly set of values, much
like the underground man's appeal to the “sublime and beautiful” or his
pathetic yearning for “a more literary quarrel”.
It was Nietzsche's genius to detect the imposture, and later on to honour Dostoevsky as its narrator: moral victory is won at
the price of this-worldly defeat that is fervently and eagerly paid by the
losers, who would otherwise be mired in the contemplation of their own defeat,
marooned in the narrator's “stink hole”.
Imaginary victory over one's
oppressors is for Nietzsche the genealogy of morals in general, the wellspring
of transcendent values and of all religiosity, the
metaphysically deferred vengeance of the defeated against their vanquishers.
The notion of resentment that
Nietzsche introduced into modern philosophy was one that described resentment
as a negative feeling that denoted moral and social deprivations that were
reflected primarily on a level of personal perceptions of the world and one’s place in it. In this context, resentment was seen
as closely connected with revenge, where revenge was seen as belonging to the
very essence of the nihilistic conception of “Will to Power” that founded the
entire philosophy of Nietzshe.
To trace the relationship between
resentment and revenge, it is useful to very briefly discuss the foundations of
“Will to Power” principle in its relationship with its conceptual predecessor,
Arthur Schoppenhauer’s concept of “Will to Life”.
Schoppenhauer’s
and Nietszche’s philosophies, which founded the
modern stream of philosophical anthropology that was intrinsically also to be
seen as a particular cosmology, come at the time of major rise of German
classic philosophy, in stark opposition to the systematic philosophical efforts
of Hegel. Schoppenhauer’s founding philosophy of life
(later to become a fully fledged philosophical discipline) was developed in
contrast with the highly depersonalised synthetic
effort by Hegel to encapsulate the structure and dynamics of world processes in
a single philosophical “encyclopedia” of its own sort, and to found it on an
intellectualism that transcends calculable and observable intelligent
processes. While Hegel with his “Absolute” could be described as a philosopher
of intellectual detachment and elaboration of the mysterious ways in which the
higher intelligence determines the major currents of history and mankind’s
destiny, Schoppenhauer, and later - in a far more
radical form, Nietzsche - insisted on a personal nature of one’s view of the
world, on the philosophical roots and characterisations
of inter-personal relationships, and on a profound scepticism
concerning man’s intentions and intentional dispositions towards other men and
women.
Where Hegel insisted that the supreme
intelligence “conducted its business in rough moves”, sometimes sacrificing the
entire collectives and nations, striving to a metaphysical end that is a higher
synthesis of all the seemingly contradictory processes in the world, Schoppenhauer warned of the pitfalls of the desire to
survive at any cost, and elaborated the concept of “Will to Life” as the source
of mutual obstruction, victimisation, and betrayal
between human beings. Schoppenhauer, who spitefully scheduled his lectures at
the same time as Hegel, only to face a few students while Hegel spoke to
hundreds, warned of the need for withdrawal from the external world, extreme
care in the conduct of one’s business, and wariness of the not necessarily
evil, but rather selfish - and, in virtue of that, also potentially destructive
- consequences of the others’ ego-driven actions. “Do not reveal any details of
yourself to others” - goes a paraphrase of Schoppenhauer
- “for they will do all they can to discover all the other details about you, and use all of them against you at the most opportune
moment”. Schoppenhauer was the philosophical force of
withdrawal and caution in the face of a great enthusiasm about the historical
role of the German nation and the capacity of philosophy to provide an
intellectual foundation for the seeming contradictions in history.
It is in this context in the history
of ideas that Nietzsche emerged as a philosophical radical. In an overwhelming
drive to overcome Schoppenhauer’s negative contention
with history and the possibility of affirmative human action, Nietzsche asserts
a developed principle partly inherited from Schoppenhauer
- The Will to Power. All creatures, not only humans, strive not only to survive
and use any available means to do so, but also to assume and retain power over
all other creatures. The founding anthropological principle is thus the desire
to acquire power and control over others. This, and only this, in Nietzsche’s
view, adequately explains the “healthy” processes in nature, and any
compromises to the principle of what was formulated in Darwin’s theory of
evolution as “survival of the fittest” are seen as signs of weakness. “Those
who are falling should be pushed to fall faster” - argues Nietzsche. The
positive value of tolerance and related values are negatively conceived, not as
expressions of strength and ability to act prudently despite the inherent
emotional “cost”, but rather as signs of factual
inability to fulfill the presumed need for control and exercise of power.
This is where, for Nietzsche, revenge
and resentment enter the picture. In his view, all those who are subdued, not
in the position to control others, harbor a natural desire for revenge and
revolt. In situations where they are factually unable to exercise this revolt
and change the structure of power to their favour,
the frustration that develops in them takes the form of “resentment”.
Resentment is a pre-requisite for what Nietzsche calls “revolt of Slave
morality”, but it also shows the actual lack of power to change the existing
constellation of power.
In the context of Nietzsche’s
philosophy, it is affirmative reactions, triumphalism and joy in one’s own
superiority that found a “healthy” self- perception of those who are able to fully exercise their inherent desire to rule. On
the other hand, all negative reactions, connected with hatred that stems from
inability to rule over others, find their expression in a desire for revenge
against those who occupy ruling positions (“the slave’s perspective”), and,
where this desire cannot be factually fulfilled, as it often cannot, one
witnesses the onset of resentment. For Nietzsche, resentment springs directly
from the essence of the human nature. Some humans will
necessarily feel resentment, just as certainly as others will necessarily
occupy positions of superiority and power, and will
thus feel predominantly “positive” emotions of self-indulgence and increasing
self- relevance.
Scheler’s concept of resentment,
although basically derived from Nietzsche’s, is far more specific and more
applicable to an explanation of social realities and possibilities of social
change. Therefore, it is a contrast form that offers another perspective to
discourse on roots and fruits of terrorism.
The key difference between the two
concepts of resentment is that for Nietzsche resentment is unconditional
wherever the structure of power, or the factual degree of control, is not
adequate to what he perceives as innate human aspirations. In other words,
irrespective of any particular social arrangements,
the underdogs will always necessarily harbour
feelings of resentment, in virtue of being human. The fact of inequality in itself is sufficient reason for human beings to resent,
rebel, hate and hope for revenge. In this context, justice or injustice in the
concrete social arrangements matter very little, “the social structure itself
is determined by the hereditary character and the value experience of the
ruling human type”.
The crucial additional qualification
that Scheler brings into Nietzsche’s concept of resentment is the concept of
entitlement in the sense that “there are “situations” - by the virtue of their
formal character itself - charged with the danger of resentment”. According to
him, resentment is more likely where there is a parallelism between formal
entitlements to social equality and great factual social inequalities. In other
words, Scheler relies far more on the gap between norms and facts than
Nietzsche. According to Scheler, human beings may indeed dislike the factual
inequalities in which they find themselves, but they are unlikely to engage in
social revolution or to exercise concrete forms of public revolt unless they
feel justified in doing so by the norms that exist formally, and yet do not
translate into the specific social positions of those who then feel resentment.
This is why in a society where there is formally an equality, and yet in social
realities there are huge inequalities, those who are in equal positions will
feel resentment, importantly a political resentment - “whenever convictions are
not arrived at by direct contact with the world and objects themselves, but
indirectly” - as the legitimacy of their social positions is questionable given
the set of norms that require equality. Nietzsche is not concerned about this
whole issue - for him this issue does not - should not exist; there is no
equality between a nobleman and a plebeian.
Scheler perceives resentment as a
desire for revenge, but he does not define the need for revenge as arising from
a de facto position of inferiority regardless of the social and legitimational preconditions and circumstances. In his
view, the desire for revenge occurs where there is at least a perceived
injustice in the social arrangements, or more generally, in the relationship at
hand. This is what enables him to state that repression, and that cause the desire for revenge, in itself,
it also contains a powerful repressive potential. Social structures
cause a desire for revenge where individuals have the right to play different
roles (to be equal), and yet in fact they are unable to exercise that right.
The frustration that gives rise to a desire for revenge is built into one’s
inability to exercise one’s legitimate rights, while in Nietzsche’s context
this desire arises wherever there is a de facto inequality and characterises the “natural” view of those at the receiving
end of any relationship. Scheler’s concept of resentment is socially refined
and, in my view, thus far more sophisticated.
Where one’s position in relation to
those of others is seen as unfair, or harmful, in a lasting sense, where there
is a felt inability to change that relationship to what is perceived to be
desirable and “just”, or “right”, the feeling of resentment develops.
Yet, Max Scheler does consider the
psychological dimension of resentment. While, on the social level, social
injustices increase the likelihood of resentment and resentful action by those
who are oppressed, on a personal level there are numerous situations of
“natural” or de facto inferiority, which cannot be shifted by changes in the
external world or in external relationships. For example, physical inabilities
threaten one’s self-perception in ways that inevitably produce resentment
towards those who are not so debilitated. This accounts for permanent
resentment that structurally determines human relationships.
Both Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s views
set the concept of resentment in a context that delineates the limits of human
ability to affirm positive values and remove resentment, envy, hatred and
revolt by creating more “just” arrangements. According to Nietzsche, for human who nurtures resentment this
becomes a necessary ingredient of his nature.
According to Scheler, this is the opposite of the truth. The difference is
that, for Nietzsche, morality rests inside one; it is a reflection and exteriorisation of one’s inner feelings
and aspirations and it arises from resentment of the existing order of things.
Scheler has quite a different concept
of morality. For him, only a pathological, distorted view is
able to see morality as arising from oneself. Morality is based on
external, albeit internalised, values and systems of
norms. One builds one’s standards and expectations on the
basis of such external values. Morality thus determines the inner
dynamics of one’s perceptions of external relations, and, even more
importantly, it enables one to pass value judgments concerning the external relations. It is impossible to judge in the
proper sense without an external set of criteria, and without a sense of
objectivity of one’s judgment. An unlimited spontaneity in judging according to
inner impulses, comfortably coated in the presumption of total egoism that is
reflected in an “innate”. “Will to Power” is in fact a negation of
responsibility, and thus also, in an important sense, a negation of morally
accountable individual freedom. Nietzsche’s philosophy is in an important sense
an anti-philosophy. It is an affirmation of instinct as the founding principle
of ones interactions, a negation of the ability to
govern oneself on the basis of mutualness
and collectively binding and recognisable norms. In
fact, in a true “genealogical” sense, Nietzsche postulates the human being, the
deontic, particular individual human being as being
prior to the morality itself, thus denying the ability of morality to play a
formative role in the generation of one’s inner value judgments. Furthermore,
it is even unclear in Nietzsche’s philosophy whether value judgments as such as
possible at all, whether they make sense in the darnels of nihilism that he
puts forward as a substitute of socially acceptable and recognisable
morality. There is no possibility to “chain” the “me, myself and I”, and why
should there be such possibility when “me, myself and I” denotes the only
“healthy” sphere of existence.
Scheler argues that resentment can colour one’s perceptions of morality only in situations
where there is an illusion of values, an inner distortion of values, so that
values are no longer perceived as importantly relational, based on recognised relations between various entitlements and
rights that belong to human beings, but rather as unconditionally arising from
the inner impulses and desires. Nietzsche disregards the structure of
frustration, and the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate, “right”
and “wrong” structures and occurrences of frustration of the presupposed desire
for power. For him, entitlements are not socially definable - they stem from
the inner structure of the human mind. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of
desires is thus unconditional. Norms and entitlements, at least seemingly, do
not play a role. However, Nietzsche recognised the
need for objective external standards that found morality. Speaks of
“falsification of value tables”, in his overwhelming desire to overturn the existing
order of values and undermine the exteriorities that seem to him to found these
“tables” and to be oppressive to human nature. In his critique of him, Scheler point out the old argument that has been used throughout the
history of philosophy. However, this very utterance presupposes that there are
the “true tables” as well, and given that they are “value tables”, they are not
merely results of inner impulses, or “otherwise, there would be nothing but a
struggle of value systems”. They have an external dimension of validity, and
thus an important intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, we are faced with the fact
that there is no plausibility in the evaluation according to the credo “there
can be only one” - and that one is the one of my own concept.
The moment one recognises the intersubjective nature
of norms, one is immediately outside the realm of
value nihilism and a completely internal domain of justification of actions and
feelings. If we have value tables, and we clearly do, then resentment is most
certainly not the source of all morality. It is in this aspect that Scheler
rightly points out that Nietzsche logically simply cannot be right, that is, that his views cannot be plausible, because “the true and objective values are
always present behind the illusory ones”. From this springs Scheler’s
evaluation of Nietzsche’s concept - the source of resentment is rightly designated but the conclusions are not “genuine”.
The crucial relationship in any
morality is that of external obligation.
One acts morally if one fully recognises and
implements in one’s actions the external obligation to standards and criteria
that constitute the proper normative framework for an external evaluation of
one’s actions (and/or one’s “character”, conceived as a totality of one’s
actions and motivations for those actions). Morality is thus essentially
external, or more precisely, it is a relationship between inner motives and
externalities that are importantly intersubjective. There is reason to argue
that a completely inner morality is not conceivable. This is an argument similar to that applied in contemporary analytic philosophy
to the concept of a “private language”. Would a “language”, a system of codes
and symbols that would be fully private, or known to only one individual, the
one who “owns” that language, be considered a language at all, even if by all
formal features it fitted into the concept of language, apart from its
inter-subjectivity? Such a system would not be a language because language has
profoundly conventional character. The same argument can be applied to an inner
morality. A morality that involved no external obligation, that were completely
based on internal urges and impulses, even if they are broadly founded in an
anthropologically conceived structure of spontaneity of human action, would
hardly be a morality at all, largely because it would not be recognisable as conforming to any set of norms on an
inter-subjective level.
Nietzsche’s concept of resentment
arises from a philosophical position that can be described as an anti-morality
since it is well-founded in skepticism in ethics. However, as was already said,
Nietzsche defends this view by claiming that the existing dominant morality is
“false”. The standard “false coin - genuine coin” argument applies - if this
morality is “wrong”, then it can only be so judged by the standards of another,
supposedly “right” morality, but nevertheless, importantly, still a morality, that
is, still inter-subjective. In the XX century, Gilbert Ryle used the same
argument to criticise epistemological scepticism: If accepted truths can be falsified - that is,
if they can be proven to be wrong - then epistemological scepticism
must be defeated, because if some propositions are wrong, this implies that
there are right propositions, which implies that there is a possibility of
knowledge of reality, which - in itself - is the anti-scepticist
thesis. I recognize a metaphorical value in the establishing of the relation
between epistemological skepticism being equivalent to moral skepticism.
Scheler uses almost exactly the same argument against Nietzsche. He starts from the assumption that social interactions are a reality.
Withdrawal from those interactions in the normative sense - in a word,
withdrawal from external morality that makes social interaction possible - is
nothing other but an anti-social stance. While this stance is perhaps
philosophically acceptable on a level of general moral or anti-moral positions,
it is logically unsustainable in the strict sense. Nietzsche here is a romantic
naturalist: his views call for a rejection of intersubjectivity, and an affirmation
of internal subjective impulses as a general norm. Yet, subjective impulses
cannot possibly be a general norm, for the existence of a generality of any
norm presupposes an external order within which it is possible for something to
be a norm. To be a norm, a proposition must have a relationship of external
obligation to internal motivations. This is one contradiction. Another
contradiction lies in the fact that in this way one is reduced to arguing for an universalisation of
subjectivity on the basis of the view that such
subjectivity, internal impulse, the desire for power, can be found in every
human being in virtue of them being
human (the strong anthropological thesis).
It would seem that
what Nietzsche tries to do is describe an underlying
reality. According to him, resentment as omnipresent, is the source of all
morality, and all other conceptions of morality are distortions of its
structure and sublimations of its real nature. Goodness is weakness, mercy is
impotence, etc.
The small step that Scheler makes in
“socializing” Nietzsche’s observations about resentment have far reaching and
devastating implications for Nietzsche’s views. On the one hand, one may
observe many regularities that confirm Nietzsche’s views. Indeed, resentment
does govern a good part of the most widespread moral and quasi-moral
sentiments. Indeed, those with physical disadvantages sometimes show seemingly
unprovoked resentment towards those who are not so disabled, which suggests
that inferiority is the source of sublimations of the raw desire to revenge
against one’s own position and inferiority relationship with others. However,
Scheler suggests that we should look closer into the actual dynamics of
revenge, primarily in the area of societal repression:
“Quite independently of the characters and experiences of individuals, a potent
charge of resentment is accumulated by the very structure of society”.
If resentment is the greatest where
the gap between legitimate entitlements arising from the perceptions of what is
“right” (fundamentally based on an external moral obligation, characteristic of
conventional morality) is the broadest, then resentment is only secondary to
the internalisation of moral values, or at least it
is not exclusively and unequivocally “primal”. This is where Scheler’s
interpretation makes the crucial step towards making possible a socially
meaningful treatment of resentment (“it has the specific value delusion”), both
in its relationship with conventional morality and in its relevance for the
social understanding of human motivations. He is interested to
point out how resentment is inspiring and how it vanishes in the
presence of genuine. Both authors talk in either/or terms but for Scheler there
is a way not to fall into the trap of resentment, like when he is discussing
resentment danger in the older generation’s relation with the younger. This way
is to compensate for what has been lost. This idea is opposed to Nietzsche’s
view that only plebeian would subscribe to
compensation. In this sense, Scheler re-shaped Nietzsche’s concept of
resentment.
Max Scheler has re-shaped Friedrich
Nietzsche’s concept of resentment, by taking from it all that is “true about
resentment in Nietzsche’s explanation”, “fruitfully” criticizing what is
“false” and “unjustified” in those explanations, and, finally, illuminating
difficulties in rooting resentment exclusively in an amoral, or even
anti-moral, purely internal structures of reactions to the world and its
values. After concluding that is fact that, apart from merely being there,
often at least seemingly in accordance with the principles espoused by
Nietzche, Scheler offered “right” information about resentment - resentment
escalates in reverse proportion with the degree of fulfillment of
inter-subjective, morality- and legitimacy-based entitlements.
Imaginary victory over one's
oppressors is for Nietzsche the genealogy of morals in general, the wellspring
of transcendent values and of all religiosity, the
metaphysically deferred vengeance of the defeated against their vanquishers.
The perplexing fact about the
“terrorist” attacks is that they do not fit our standard opposition of Evil as
egotism, as disregard for the common Good, and Good as the spirit of (and
actual readiness for) the sacrifice for some higher Cause: terrorists cannot
but appear as something akin to John Milton's Satan with his “Evil, be thou my
Good”: while they pursue (what appears to us) evil goals with evil means, the
very form of their activity meets the highest standard of the Good. The
resolution of this enigma is easy, known already to Jean Jacques Rousseau:
egotism (the concern for one's well-being) is not opposed to common good, since
altruistic norms can easily be deduced from egotist concerns (Ansell- Pearson,
K., 1996). Individualism versus communitarianism, utilitarianism versus
universal normativism, are false oppositions, since the two opposed options
amount to the same as to their result. The critics who complain how, in today's
hedonistic-egotistic society, true values are lacking, totally miss the point:
the true opposite of egotist self-love is not altruism, concern for common
Good, but envy, resentment, which makes me act against my own interests.
Sigmund Freud already knew it: death-drive is opposed to pleasure principle as
well as to reality principle, i.e., the true “Evil” (death drive) involves
self-sabotage, it makes us act against our own interests. Saint Augustin knew
it so well - recall the passage from his Confessions,
the scene of a baby jealous for his brother sucking
the mother's breast (“I myself have seen and known an
infant to be jealous though it could not speak. It became pale,
and cast bitter looks on its foster-brother”.)
Based on previously presented
insight, majority of late XX century French intellectuals convincingly
criticize John Rawls’s theory of justice: in the Rawls' model of a just
society, social inequalities are tolerated only insofar as they are based on
natural inequalities, which are considered contingent, not merits. What Rawls
doesn't see is how such a society would create conditions for an uncontrolled
explosion of resentment: in it, I would know that my lower status is fully
“justified”, and would thus be deprived of excusing my
failure as the result of social injustice. Rawls thus proposes a terrifying
model of a society in which hierarchy is directly legitimized in natural
properties, thereby missing the simple lesson of an anecdote about a Slovene
peasant who is given a choice by a good witch: she will either give him one
cow, and to his neighbour two cows, or take from him
one cow, and from his neighbour two cows - the
peasant immediately chooses the second option. (In a more morbid version, the
witch tells him: “I will do to you whatever you want, but I warn you, I will do
it to your neighbour twice!” The peasant, with a
cunning smile, asks her: “Take one of my eyes!”)
Friedrich Hayek knew that it is much
easier to accept inequalities if one can claim that they result from an
impersonal blind force, so the good thing about “irrationality” of the market
success or failure in capitalism (recall the old motif of market as the modern
version of the imponderable Fate) is that it allows me precisely to perceive my
failure (or success) as “undeserved”, contingent. The fact that capitalism is
not “just” is thus a key feature that makes it palpable to the majority (I can
accept much more easily my failure if I know that it is not due to my inferior
qualities, but to chance).
What Nietzsche and Freud share is the
idea that justice as equality is founded on envy - on the envy of the Other who
has what we do not have, and who enjoys it; the demand for justice is thus
ultimately the demand that the excessive enjoyment of the Other should be
curtailed, so that everyone's access to jouissance
should be equal (jouissance is a
French term which can be roughly translated as “enjoyment“ and is contrasted
with plaisir. In every sense of the
word, it is whatever “gets you off”). The necessary outcome of this demand, of
course, is asceticism: since it is not possible to impose equal jouissance, what one can impose is only
the equally shared prohibition. However, one should not forget that today, in
our allegedly permissive society, this asceticism assumes precisely the form of
its opposite, of the generalised superego injunction
“Enjoy!”.
We are all under the spell of this
injunction, with the outcome that our enjoyment is more hindered than ever -
recall the yuppie who combines Narcissistic “Self-Fulfillment” with utter
ascetic discipline of jogging, eating health food, etc. This, perhaps, is what
Nietzsche had in mind with his notion of the Last Man - it is only today that
we can really discern the contours of the Last Man, in the guise of the
hedonistic asceticism of yuppies. Nietzsche thus does not simply urge
life-assertion against asceticism: he is well aware
how a certain asceticism is the obverse of the decadent excessive sensuality -
therein resides his criticism of Wagner's Parsifal,
and, more generally, of the late Romantic decadence oscillating between damp
sensuality and obscure spiritualism.
To define envy, we should recall
again the Augustinian scene of a sibling envying his brother who is sucking the
mother's breast: the subject does not envy the Other's possession of the prized
object as such, but rather the way the Other is able to enjoy this object -
which is why it is not enough for him simply to steal and thus gain possession
of the object: his true aim is to destroy the Other's ability/capacity to enjoy
the object. As such, envy is to be located into the triad of envy, thrift and
melancholy, the three forms of not being able to enjoy the object (and, of
course, reflexively enjoying this very impossibility). In contrast to the
subject of envy, who envies the other's possession and/or jouissance of the object, the miser possesses the object, but
cannot enjoy/consume it - his satisfaction derives from just possessing it,
elevating it into a sacred, untouchable/prohibited, entity which should under
no conditions be consumed (recall the proverbial figure of the lone miser who,
upon returning home, safely locks the doors, opens up his chest and then takes
the secret peek at his prized object, observing it in awe); this very hindrance
that prevents the consummation of the object guarantees its status of the
object of desire. The melancholic subject, like the miser, possesses the
object, but loses the cause that made him desire it: this figure, most tragic
of them all, has free access to all he wants, but finds no satisfaction in it.
This excess of envy is the base of
Rousseau's well-known, but nonetheless not fully exploited, distinction between
egotism, amour-de-soi (which
natural), and amour-propre, the
perverted preferring of oneself to others in which I focus not on achieving the
goal, but on destroying the obstacle to it:
“The primitive passions, which all
directly tend towards our happiness, make us deal only with objects which
relate to them, and whose principle is only amour
de soi, are all in their essence lovable and tender; however, when,
diverted from their objects by obstacles, they are more occupied with the
obstacle they try to get rid of, than with the object they try to reach, they
change their nature and become irascible and hateful. This is how amour de soi, which is a noble and
absolute feeling, becomes amour-propre,
that is to say, a relative feeling by means of which one compares oneself, a
feeling which demands preferences, whose enjoyment is purely negative and which
does not strive to find satisfaction in our own well-being, but only in the
misfortune of others.”
For Rousseau, an evil person is not
an egotist, “thinking only about his own interests”: a true egotist is all too
busy with taking care of his own good to have time to cause misfortunes to
others, while the primary vice of a bad person is precisely that he is more
occupied with others than with himself. Rousseau describes a precise libidinal
mechanism: the inversion which generates the shift of the libidinal investment
from the object to the obstacle itself. This is why egalitarianism itself
should never be accepted at its face value: the notion (and practice) of
egalitarian justice, insofar as it is sustained by envy, relies on the
inversion of the standard renunciation accomplished to benefit others: “I am
ready to renounce it, so that others will (also) not (be able to) have it”! Far
from being opposed to the spirit of sacrifice, Evil is thus the very spirit of
sacrifice, ready to ignore one's own well-being - if, through my sacrifice, I
can deprive the Other of his jouissance.
Is this sad fact that the opposition to the system cannot articulate itself in
the guise of a realistic alternative, or at least a meaningful utopian project,
but only as a meaningless outburst, not the strongest indictment of our
predicament? Where is here the celebrated freedom of choice, when the only
choice is the one between playing by the rules and (self)destructive violence,
a violence which is almost exclusively directed against one's own - the cars
burned and the schools torched were not from rich neighbourhoods,
but were part of the hard-won acquisitions of the very strata from which
protesters originate.
Stemming from the previously
outlined, the notion of evaluation seems to be crucial for the functioning of a
democratic society: if, at the level of their symbolic identity, all subjects
are equal, if, here, if they can be indefinitely substituted to each other,
since each of them is reduced to an empty punctual place ($), to a “man without
qualities-properties”, if, consequently, every reference to their properly
symbolic mandate is prohibited, how then, are they to be distributed within the
social edifice, how can their occupation be legitimized? The answer imposing
itself is, evaluation: one has to evaluate - as
objectively as possible, and through all possible means, from quantified
testing of their abilities to more “personalised”
in-depth interviews - their potentials. The underlying ideal notion is to
produce their characterization deprived of all traces of symbolic identities.
Here the standard Leftist critics who denounce the hidden cultural bias of
evaluations and tests miss the point: the problem with evaluation, with its
total objectivation of criteria, is not that it is unjust, but precisely that
it is just in it’s essence.
What this means is that the
“deconstructionist”/”risk society” commonplace according to which the
contemporary individual experiences himself as thoroughly denaturalized, that
he experiences even his most “natural” features (from his ethnic identity to his
sexual preferences) as something chosen, historically contingent, to be
learned, is profoundly deceiving: what we are effectively witnessing today is
the opposite process of an unheard-of re-naturalization: all big “public
issues” are (re)translated into questions about the regulation and stances
towards intimate “natural”/”personal” idiosyncrasies. This is also why, at a
more general level, the pseudo- naturalized ethnico-religious
conflicts are the form of struggle which fits global capitalism: in our age of
“post-politics”, when politics proper is progressively replaced by expert
social administration, the only remaining legitimate source of conflicts are
cultural (religious) or natural (ethnic) tensions. “Evaluation” is, precisely,
the regulation of social promotion that fits this massive renaturalisation.
So, perhaps, the time has come to reassert, as the truth of evaluation, the
perverted logic of commodity fetishism: Today, in our times of evaluation, to
be a computer expert or a successful manager is a gift of nature, while to have
a beautiful lips or eyes is a fact of culture.
Typically listed “roots” of terrorism
are: religious fundamentalism, resentment, history of
violence, lack of power and resources (such as a national military which has
the capacity to challenge the enemy), poverty, psychology.
Typically listed “fruits” of
terrorism are: innocent death of civilians, the
creation of fear to make a public statement (terrorist activities are designed
to be seen by others, not only to be felt by the victims), unpredictable
violence, inexpensive methods of causing destruction, martyrdom.
Recent historical events confirm that
strategies, actions and policies employed for a specific purpose create new
unanticipated problems (the rise of bin Laden and Sadaam Hussein). Catastrophic
blowbacks have already been experienced to certain extent. From a psychological
perspective, much blowback is predictable and preventable. Taking the
perspective of the other, empathy, following consequences through time,
avoiding humiliation, addressing suffering, despair, poverty, culture, and
designing win-win strategies, using language, policies and interventions that
give hope and reduce tension go a long way in reducing violence.
There is a belief that if others are
afraid of our power they will submit to our demands and we will be safer. This
works under specific conditions, but not others, and is risky with weapons of
mass destruction. It is a psychological fact that people are most dangerous
when they are afraid, even more than when they are angry. We, too, are more
dangerous when we are afraid. Also, keeping in mind that envy and humiliation
are highly associated with violence and the breakdown of deterrence, strategies
should be designed to reduce fear and provide assurances, US unilateralism, in
its disregard of global community is causing a range of problematic emotional
reactions around the world, including resentment, fear, hatred, anxiety,
terror, dread, envy, humiliation, intimidation, anger, rage, insult, and a
healthy desire for a respectful responsiveness which, if not met will naturally
drive others, in desperation, towards a desire for revenge. This endangers US
citizens.
Policies, strategies, and language organized around one's own security needs and sense of
rightness with no consciousness about how these are experienced and received by
other actors. Making incorrect assumptions about the psychology of the other,
i.e., assuming deterrence will work, imposing demands and ultimata, when defiance to greater power is valued in
a culture.
Terrorism is a form of asymmetrical
warfare. Arms proliferation is a response to asymmetry. Power imbalances are
unstable in the long term. Domination, oppression, humiliation, and suffering
provoke the desire to even the scales as we see in universal myths like David
and Goliath. As 9/11 shows, there is no amount of power that cannot be turned
against any target.
Psychological techniques induce us to
accept the absurd as rational. The use of an exaggerated, distorted image of
the enemy, disinformation, misinformation, and censorship, play on fear and use
fear to justify foreign and domestic policy. This keeps us ignorant and
precludes balanced, complex thinking about less dangerous strategies. Flawed
concepts and dismissals such as the need to maintain a “credible threat”, “the
only language they understand is force”, and deterrence theory mystify us into
believing that these are proven concepts that work all the time. False beliefs
such as there are no effective alternatives to military solutions (“we have no
choice, they will attack us if we are perceived as weak, we must show resolve,
etc.”) divert us from enlightened action.
“Conscious Politics” comprises many
concepts such as “political wisdom” or “political maturity” that labels
policies transcending particular interests, dualistic
thinking, and consider optimal, win-win strategies with long-term benefit.
In the world of today, in order to find balanced response to terrorism different
responses are sought. The prevailing ones are military, legal, and peacemaking
models of response.
The current military model of
response to international violence and terrorism endorses a theory the current
Bush Administration calls pre- emption - attack the enemy because they might
attack us. It believes that unilateralism (acting individually without the
support of other nations) is often necessary. A military model believes that
power, a large weapons arsenal, and a willingness to use military might are
deterrents to violence. It defines an enemy and believes the enemy must be
eradicated.
The only responsible legal response
to the attacks is the strengthening, differentiation, institutionalization and
enforcement of international law (Borradori G.,
2004). A law enforcement model of response to international violence and
terrorism endorses a theory of international cooperation. It supports entities
like the United Nations and the work of international inspectors. A law
enforcement model is based upon the rule of law as the guiding principle in
interactions among nations, and focuses on controlling
and minimizing criminal activity.
A peacemaking model of response to
international violence and terrorism endorses the belief that reconciliation
between leaders and nations is possible. It emphasizes the importance of
international standards for human rights and seeks to prevent the root causes
of terrorism. It calls for a reduction in the trading of weapons. It believes
rehabilitation of the enemy is possible.
If resentment remains to be in the
core of understanding terrorism, one way or the other (as “root” or as
“fruit”), it appears that any sustainable strategy to deal with terrorism in
XXI century has to start with the reconstruction of legitimacy both through the
re-establishment of rule of law and through more inclusive ideologies that
offer an alternative to extremism. Any actions therefore taken to deal with
terrorism have to be undertaken within the framework
of international law and have to be aimed at countering
the ideology of ‘fear and hatred’ with a genuine effort to win ‘hearts and minds’. Such efforts must be made as acts of “conscious
politics” created on the basis of political wisdom” or
“political maturity” that labels policies transcending particular
interests, dualistic thinking, and consider optimal, win-win strategies
with long-term benefit.
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U kontekstu
napora da se, u odgovoru na terorističke napade i strah
od terorizima, formira odgovarajuća međunarodna i nacionalna politika,
u tekstu su razmatrani različiti koncepti revolta pojmovno određenog kroz široki dijapazon
osećanja koja uključuju mržnju ogorčenost, antipatiju, nesviđanje itd. Naime, bez obzira na neslaganje
među teoretičarima ali i među
onima koji politički odlučuju, a koje postoji u savremenom diskur- su u pogledu
pozicioniranja u vremenu spram terorizma (da li je terori- zam posledica
ili je terorizam uzrok), revolt se tipično navodi kao kon-
cept ključan za razumevanje terorizma. Putem skiciranja nekih različitih pristupa određenju koncepta revolta, autorka nastoji da ukaže na to da je multidisciplinarni pristup u izučavanju ove pojave neophodan za krei- ranje efikasne
i održive antiterorističke politike.
KLJUČNE REČI: terorizam
/ revolt / društveni odnosi
/ politika