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RESENTMENT AND TERRORISM: ROOTS AND FRUITS

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This paper is presenting concepts of resentment defined within the wide scope of feelings such as bitterness, disliking, jealousy, envy, etc., in the context of ongoing international and national efforts to conceive an adequate response to terrorist attacks and fear from terrorism. Although there is a lack of agreement between scholars and policy-makers marking the contemporary discourse in relation to determination whether resentment is the cause or it is the consequence of terrorism, resentment is typically referred to as the key concept to understand terrorism. By outlining several different approaches to resentment concept frameworks, author is trying to point out that in research oriented towards phenomenon of terrorism and designing of efficient and sustainable anti-terrorist policy, multidisciplinary approach is needed.

KEY WORDS: terrorism / resentment / social relationships / policy

High-profile terrorist incidents, such as the event of 9/11, lead to attempts by national governments and international governing bodies to re-direct efforts against terrorism in function of political objectives.

Sociologists have, by and large, neglected the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The history of terrorism and counter-terrorism as topics of sociological reflection is straightforward. Until recently very few scholarly studies of terrorism and related issues had been conducted in the sociological community (Beck, U., 2002; Deflem, M., 1997; Etzioni, A., 2002; Webb, 2002). Most terrorism-related research was conducted in other social sciences, especially political science, international studies, and law. Social control and counter-terrorism are complex realities, comprised of a multitude of dimensions which are not necessarily in tune with one another.

Continued relevance that terrorism may be expected to have in our era should stimulate the development of new sociological ideas. Political scientists have focused on the relationship between terrorism and political rights and on policies against terrorism in relation to foreign policy. Terrorism has intellectually also connected with the interests of international studies scholars, who have investigated terrorism and counter-terrorism in terms of the manifold interconnections between nations and other localities. Scholars of law, finally, have approached problems of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the specialty areas of international law and criminal law. There is no doubt that insights on terrorism in these social-science disciplines are highly relevant, but a distinctive tradition of a sociology of terrorism is sadly missing, despite the occasional exceptions (Gibbs, J. P., 1989).

Terrorism scholarship also comprises the study of counter-terrorism, defined as the whole of policies and practices responding to terrorism. Counter-terrorism, however, has been relatively much less addressed than terrorism, mirroring a differential concern related to power and authority which sociologists have often noted. The existing literature focuses on counter-terrorism mostly as one aspect of a broader focus in terms of national legislation and international policy. Whatever its causes, the relative neglect of research on the institutional dimensions of counter-terrorism has *de facto* led to an important omission in scholarship.

The aim of this paper has been less to provide definite answers than to introduce an intellectual scaffolding with which to tentatively challenge rigidity some scholarships have towards combining disparate disciplines

as at this time we might do well to learn from our neighbouring academic fellows. Perhaps, it is even as ambitious as to instigate more enthusiastic approach in theoretical correlations among disciplines in order to be able to provide comprehensive answer to the issue raised with the title of this paper. We would do well not to close the door in face of the unfamiliar; let us embrace it instead as the fresh hope, instilled in a seemingly hopeless situation that permits a possibility for change (Fisher, R., 1996; Cohen, R., 1996; Hopmann, T. P., 1995). There is an obvious practical dimension in such intellectual effort - in the context of policy making, models created by intellectual efforts might provide policy makers with some feeling for the implications of various policy options. Just how much we can actually apply scientific discovery and mathematical models to political theory, or psychological studies to international relations and fight against terrorism, is not clear. However, an introduction of fresh thought is always a hope for a brighter future. If there is a chance for a more stable and equitable state of affairs in the world threatened by growing terrorist violence, in order to provide redefinition of current strategies, scholars should jump at the occasion to explore its possibilities. Critical thinking and interdisciplinary research can be helpful in the development of new frameworks for internationally adopted approach to promote lasting success. Continued improvement in the practice of dealing with terrorism must always be sought.

DIFFERENT POLICY RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

The United States has based it's *National Strategy to Combat Terrorism* on several steps:

1. Defeat terrorists and their organizations:
 - (i) Identify terrorists and terrorist organizations.
 - (ii) Locate terrorists and their organizations.
 - (iii) Destroy terrorists and their organizations.
2. Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists;
 - (i) End the state sponsorship of terrorism.
 - (ii) Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism.

- (iii) Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism.
 - (iv) Working with willing and able states.
 - (v) Enabling weak states.
 - (vi) Persuading reluctant states.
 - (vii) Compelling unwilling states.
 - (viii) Interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists.
 - (ix) Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens.
3. Diminishing the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit:
- (i) Partner with the international community to strengthen weak states and prevent (re)emergence of terrorism.
 - (ii) Win the war of ideals.
4. Defend United States citizens and interests at home and abroad:
- (i) Implement the Nation Strategy for Homeland Security.
 - (ii) Attain domain awareness.
 - (iii) Enhance measures to ensure the integrity, reliability, and availability of critical physical and information-based infrastructures at home and abroad.
 - (iv) Integrate measures to protect U.S. citizens abroad.
 - (v) Ensure an integrated incident management capability.

Operative definition of terrorism in the United States foreign policy is framed by Federal Criminal Code. Chapter 113b of Part I of Title 18 of the Code defines terrorism and lists the crimes associated with terrorism. In Section 2331 of Chapter 113b, terrorism is defined as:

“(...) activities that involve violent (...) or life-threatening acts (...) that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State and (...) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (...) if domestic (...) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (...) if international (...) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (...)”.

Although there is no one international definition of terrorism accepted, it appears it would not be a controversial idea to define terrorism as an act

of openly voiced antagonism, with developed resonance in use of aggression, deception and coercion.

In the wake of the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombing, Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, said, "It is clear that force alone cannot win the fight against terrorism." Prodi was hardly the first continental leader to implicitly criticize United States policy as short-sighted and to suggest that there are clear and compelling alternatives to America's strategy in the war on terror. Soon after 9/11 itself, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin traced terrorist acts to "tension, frustration, antiradicalism," which in turn "are linked to inequality," which would have to be addressed. In 2002, France's foreign minister famously termed US policy toward terrorism "simplistic" precisely because it did not look to root causes, the situations, poverty, injustice. Norway's Prime Minister, Kjell Bondevik, insisted that "fighting terrorism should be about more than using your military and freezing finances," and convened two international conferences on the root causes of terrorism in 2003.

DIFFERENT THEORETICAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

Prominent British author Mary Kaldor is among scholars who have criticised the "War on Terrorism" as counterproductive. She believes the problem is broader than this and that we should be worried about is the rise of extremist religious and nationalist/ethnic networks, composed of both state and non-state actors, who deliberately inflict large-scale violence against civilians (genocide, massacres, population displacement, communal riots, suicide bombers) and who are often engaged in all kinds of illicit activities (drug trade, human trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms sales, and so on). Although most public attention is focused on Islamic groups, this phenomenon can be found in all major world religions (Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist) and also among many national or ethnic groups. According to Kaldor, a balanced model of response to terrorism and international violence by utilizing non-military as well as military tools. Non-military tools are the following:

(i) Education, as universal primary education would be very important in reducing the incentive to send children to religious schools. Education of girls is especially important. Above all, the most important challenge is

cognitive; how to take seriously the principle that all human beings are equal.

(ii) Media, as there needs to be much greater investment in global public (but not state) radio and TV. Independent community radio is especially important in countering extremist propaganda.

(iii) Welfare, as the decline in social services has provided openings for humanitarian NGOs who also bring with them a political message.

(iv) Jobs, as unemployed or criminalized young men are the main breeding ground for these ideologies. Development needs to give priority to legitimate ways for these young people to make a living. Above all, the most important challenge is cognitive; how to take seriously the principle that all human beings are equal (Kaldor, M., 2006),

Neil J. Kressel thinks that study of international conflict must go beyond "the psychology of attitudes, perceptions, and group dynamics," he also discusses how these latter components must nonetheless be included in the analysis and balanced equally among the economic, military. (Kressel, N.J., 2002).

Diane Perlman claims we need to replace war with "metaforce" - complex strategies that combine non-violent forms of force including economic, educational, political, psychological, social, moral, spiritual, and physical forms of force. She suggests systematic strategies, including reducing the opponent's fear, avoiding cornering the opponent, avoiding retaliating, satisfying just grievances, understanding the meaning of their attack, removing pressures, using mediators, designing win-win solutions, etc. including some harsher non-violent approaches when the more positive ones don't work. If we are to prevent the spiral of terrorist violence, we need to move into a post-military paradigm as other options - negotiations and conflict resolution seem ineffective in dealing with brutal regimes (Perlman, D., 2006).

Political science must be at least partially inclusive of psychological exploration, for "all social behaviour," Talcott Parsons writes, "including the 'policies' of the most complex collectivities like nation-states, is ultimately the behaviour of human beings" (Parsons, T., 1978). The fundamentals of basic human relations provide initial footing to those

international, which can then be understandable in terms of the motivation of “unique individuals, albeit perhaps millions of them.

TERRORISM AND JUSTIFICATION: THE CONTENT OF FEELINGS

As contemporary international order is conceived on the idea that “joint security can be ensured only by cooperative efforts to advance their common interests”, one may ask herself/himself if it is possible to reach sustainable agreement upon primary issues only after finding an answer to the question: What is the meaning of terrorist attacks?

Nothing is more telling about the terrorist attacks in the United States than the nature of their targets. The Twin Towers in New York City represented the future, modernity, America's optimistic outlook of the world and, more recently, of globalization. The terrorist attacks constitute a direct hit against those values, which is the main reason why the whole Western world immediately rallied in support. But that's not the whole story. Many people around the world outside the traditionally defined Western nations showed profound consternation, but others clearly did not. Many citizens of Third World nations did not jump out in solidarity with America and most of those governments, even when outwardly supportive, were less than wholeheartedly committed to their words.

In order to analyse the nature of the responses, for or against supporting the United States, and explore their meaning, we need to focus on the elemental role of resentment - re-thinking resentment as a cause and/or consequence of terrorism explored in this paper is aimed at to be the base on examining possibilities for “empathetic understanding” among individuals to be used as “domain of validity” for reaching mutually acceptable solutions to be found in order for there to be any sustainable approach to deal with terrorism. The religious motivation of the terrorist is transparent and, on its own terms, irrefutable, since by definition its sacred inspiration and goal are exempt from all forms of human inquiry; its sanctions transcend all worldly jurisdiction, descending from a hieratic point of reference beyond the pale of human tribunals. Pre- or post-political in the sense of being unavailable to worldly negotiation, its

violence is sacred in all that the latter term denotes as absolute, beyond appeal, unanswerable to human reason.

Seen from afar, many observers thought that the attacks, as bloody and heinous as they might be, were justified. Their views ranged from the specific to the abstract, but all coincided in at least one factor: they evidenced a profound resentment, if not hatred, against the United States. What these observations have in common is that they show a deep misunderstanding of the United States, as well as resentment against it. It is needless to argue that those positions immediately led to a very peculiar form of moral relativism. Terrorism is to be condemned, many of them said, but sometimes it may be justified.

Terrorism has as its prime objective not only to destroy and demoralize, but also to foster a sense of chaos. It seeks to destroy the spine of a society by undermining its values and generating forces willing to sacrifice its very democratic nature in order to confront the common enemy. In this sense, as Bin Laden's statements exemplify, the terrorists' main aim is political: they use terror to advance a cause. In this, counter to conventional wisdom, terrorists are absolutely rational: they know what they want and have found a way to advance their interests. What these terrorists may not have counted on is that their own front is not unanimous about their cause. The deep social divisions that are obvious in places such as Algeria, but also in Egypt, are at least as profound as those in Western nations. Given this, it is critical to fight terrorism with weapons that could ultimately defeat it, rather than running the risk of further nurturing it with the wrong measures.

The problems of open and democratic societies are not new. Decades ago, an eminent philosopher, Karl Popper, wrote an exceptional essay about the unique difficulties that liberal societies confront (Popper, K., 1995). In *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Popper argued that in liberal societies there are always remnants of the tribalism from which they come and that the shock of transition to modern society frequently creates reactionary movements that attempt to return to their origins. Modernity and tribalism thus enter into conflict, each trying to have its way. The fanaticism that motivates the terrorist may be explained by

these tensions. What 9/11 proves is that these fights can be extremely bloody and violent.

Self-effacement as a tactic is a recipe for conformity, such as the underground man exhibits in his irreproachable dress code, and the terrorists in theirs. However, its pressures can also, and of necessity, result in eruptions of incivility, such as the underground man recalls in dealing nastily with his clients as a petty bureaucrat. In the desacralised, secularised West, we regularly tend to write off the terrorists as religious fanatics whose motivations are alien to our culture.

Uniquely or narrowly religious explanations do not suffice, as if cognitive mastery were achieved by portraying religion as the other and enemy of rationality and civil society. This is a view stance advocated in the contemporary academic discourse by some authors, whose only point of agreement, perhaps, is the need to expel religion from the councils of those bent on a scientific understanding of human experience. Yet mainstream Islam has unequivocally denounced the events of September 11. The political leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, President Khatami, has dissociated his religion from such terrorism by labelling it, at a speech at the UN in January 2002, as the work of nihilists with whom no culture can find common ground.

It appears that, in this context, we should think of how to respond anthropologically, dispassionately and scientifically, to the cognitive imperative implied by the Roman adage *homo sum et nihil humani alienum puto*, which remains axiomatic for all inter-human inquiry? In other words, more in line with Friedrich Nietzsche's own phrasing, we should consider how to understand what is all-too-human about this exercise of apocalyptic violence in its appeal to hieratic and unanswerable transcendence.

THE NOTION OF RESENTMENT

Resentment as a structural concept is a powerful tool for understanding human relations. As an affect, a personal experience, it has a mostly negative valence; like envy, it is what we deplore on the part of others, of the losers in a competition we see as free, fair, and open. Within the

global economic system - and the 9/11 events establish irrevocably that we and our antagonists no less than our allies are in a one-world system, all of whose economic and social machinery is in play - the only thing that is open to appropriation on the part of some is the technological means of destroying the game entirely, as justified by raising the stakes to an absolute, transcendent level beyond this-worldly appeal. The very mobility of our technology, as it miniaturizes the means of massive destructiveness, has the inconvenient and ironic result of levelling the playing field, not in terms of economic redistribution but solely in those of colossal destructiveness. In sum, we live in a world, as Robert Kaplan, an author recently mostly associated with the idea of existence of "an empire as the antidote to anarchy, policed by American soldiers holding an assault rifle in one hand and offering candy bars with the other", sums it up, "that is closer and more dangerous than ever". To the extent that a "global village" is in the making, the same principles and techniques of interpretation apply to its analysis as to the relatively more circumscribed and self-contained communities that anthropologists have studied in remoter and more traditional societies. Interpretation would focus on sacrificial practices, as countless earlier studies have done.

The terrorist's vengeful strategy reflects clearly enough the psychology of "loser wins", whereby the winnings at the table are discounted by the loser as worthless by contrast with gains to be won at another, higher, ideal or transcendent level. The pathos of defeat in this world is ennobled by appeal to an eternal, unworldly set of values, much like the underground man's appeal to the "sublime and beautiful" or his pathetic yearning for "a more *literary* quarrel". It was Nietzsche's genius to detect the imposture, and later on to honour Dostoevsky as its narrator: moral victory is won at the price of this-worldly defeat that is fervently and eagerly paid by the losers, who would otherwise be mired in the contemplation of their own defeat, marooned in the narrator's "stink hole".

Imaginary victory over one's oppressors is for Nietzsche the genealogy of morals in general, the wellspring of transcendent values and of all religiosity, the metaphysically deferred vengeance of the defeated against their vanquishers.

The notion of resentment that Nietzsche introduced into modern philosophy was one that described resentment as a negative feeling that denoted moral and social deprivations that were reflected primarily on a level of personal perceptions of the world and one's place in it. In this context, resentment was seen as closely connected with revenge, where revenge was seen as belonging to the very essence of the nihilistic conception of "Will to Power" that founded the entire philosophy of Nietzsche.

To trace the relationship between resentment and revenge, it is useful to very briefly discuss the foundations of "Will to Power" principle in its relationship with its conceptual predecessor, Arthur Schopenhauer's concept of "Will to Life".

Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's philosophies, which founded the modern stream of philosophical anthropology that was intrinsically also to be seen as a particular cosmology, come at the time of major rise of German classic philosophy, in stark opposition to the systematic philosophical efforts of Hegel. Schopenhauer's founding philosophy of life (later to become a fully fledged philosophical discipline) was developed in contrast with the highly depersonalised synthetic effort by Hegel to encapsulate the structure and dynamics of world processes in a single philosophical "encyclopedia" of its own sort, and to found it on an intellectualism that transcends calculable and observable intelligent processes. While Hegel with his "Absolute" could be described as a philosopher of intellectual detachment and elaboration of the mysterious ways in which the higher intelligence determines the major currents of history and mankind's destiny, Schopenhauer, and later - in a far more radical form, Nietzsche - insisted on a personal nature of one's view of the world, on the philosophical roots and characterisations of inter-personal relationships, and on a profound scepticism concerning man's intentions and intentional dispositions towards other men and women.

Where Hegel insisted that the supreme intelligence "conducted its business in rough moves", sometimes sacrificing the entire collectives and nations, striving to a metaphysical end that is a higher synthesis of all the seemingly contradictory processes in the world, Schopenhauer warned of the pitfalls of the desire to survive at any cost, and elaborated the concept of "Will to Life" as the source of mutual obstruction,

victimisation, and betrayal between human beings. Schopenhauer, who spitefully scheduled his lectures at the same time as Hegel, only to face a few students while Hegel spoke to hundreds, warned of the need for withdrawal from the external world, extreme care in the conduct of one's business, and wariness of the not necessarily evil, but rather selfish - and, in virtue of that, also potentially destructive - consequences of the others' ego-driven actions. "Do not reveal any details of yourself to others" - goes a paraphrase of Schopenhauer - "for they will do all they can to discover all the other details about you, and use all of them against you at the most opportune moment". Schopenhauer was the philosophical force of withdrawal and caution in the face of a great enthusiasm about the historical role of the German nation and the capacity of philosophy to provide an intellectual foundation for the seeming contradictions in history.

It is in this context in the history of ideas that Nietzsche emerged as a philosophical radical. In an overwhelming drive to overcome Schopenhauer's negative contention with history and the possibility of affirmative human action, Nietzsche asserts a developed principle partly inherited from Schopenhauer - The Will to Power. All creatures, not only humans, strive not only to survive and use any available means to do so, but also to assume and retain power over all other creatures. The founding anthropological principle is thus the desire to acquire power and control over others. This, and only this, in Nietzsche's view, adequately explains the "healthy" processes in nature, and any compromises to the principle of what was formulated in Darwin's theory of evolution as "survival of the fittest" are seen as signs of weakness. "Those who are falling should be pushed to fall faster" - argues Nietzsche. The positive value of tolerance and related values are negatively conceived, not as expressions of strength and ability to act prudently despite the inherent emotional "cost", but rather as signs of *factual inability* to fulfill the presumed need for control and exercise of power.

This is where, for Nietzsche, revenge and resentment enter the picture. In his view, all those who are subdued, not in the position to control others, harbor a natural desire for revenge and revolt. In situations where they are factually unable to exercise this revolt and change the structure of power to their favour, the frustration that develops in them takes the form

of "resentment". Resentment is a pre-requisite for what Nietzsche calls "revolt of Slave morality", but it also shows the actual lack of power to change the existing constellation of power.

In the context of Nietzsche's philosophy, it is affirmative reactions, triumphalism and joy in one's own superiority that found a "healthy" self-perception of those who are able to fully exercise their inherent desire to rule. On the other hand, all negative reactions, connected with hatred that stems from inability to rule over others, find their expression in a desire for revenge against those who occupy ruling positions ("the slave's perspective"), and, where this desire cannot be factually fulfilled, as it often cannot, one witnesses the onset of resentment. For Nietzsche, resentment springs directly from the essence of the human nature. Some humans will necessarily feel resentment, just as certainly as others will necessarily occupy positions of superiority and power, and will thus feel predominantly "positive" emotions of self-indulgence and increasing self-relevance.

Scheler's concept of resentment, although basically derived from Nietzsche's, is far more specific and more applicable to an explanation of social realities and possibilities of social change. Therefore, it is a contrast form that offers another perspective to discourse on roots and fruits of terrorism.

The key difference between the two concepts of resentment is that for Nietzsche resentment is unconditional wherever the structure of power, or the factual degree of control, is not adequate to what he perceives as innate human aspirations. In other words, irrespective of any particular social arrangements, the underdogs will always necessarily harbour feelings of resentment, in virtue of being human. The fact of inequality in itself is sufficient reason for human beings to resent, rebel, hate and hope for revenge. In this context, justice or injustice in the concrete social arrangements matter very little, "the social structure itself is determined by the hereditary character and the value experience of the ruling human type".

The crucial additional qualification that Scheler brings into Nietzsche's concept of resentment is the concept of entitlement in the sense that "there are "situations" - by the virtue of their formal character itself -

charged with the danger of resentment". According to him, resentment is more likely where there is a parallelism between formal entitlements to social equality and great factual social inequalities. In other words, Scheler relies far more on the gap between norms and facts than Nietzsche. According to Scheler, human beings may indeed dislike the factual inequalities in which they find themselves, but they are unlikely to engage in social revolution or to exercise concrete forms of public revolt unless they feel justified in doing so by the norms that exist formally, and yet do not translate into the specific social positions of those who then feel resentment. This is why in a society where there is formally an equality, and yet in social realities there are huge inequalities, those who are in equal positions will feel resentment, importantly a political resentment - "whenever convictions are not arrived at by direct contact with the world and objects themselves, but indirectly" - as the legitimacy of their social positions is questionable given the set of norms that require equality. Nietzsche is not concerned about this whole issue - for him this issue does not - should not exist; there is no equality between a nobleman and a plebeian.

Scheler perceives resentment as a desire for revenge, but he does not define the need for revenge as arising from a de facto position of inferiority regardless of the social and legitimational preconditions and circumstances. In his view, the desire for revenge occurs where there is at least a perceived injustice in the social arrangements, or more generally, in the relationship at hand. This is what enables him to state that repression, and that cause the desire for revenge, in itself, it also contains a powerful repressive potential. Social structures cause a desire for revenge where individuals have the right to play different roles (to be equal), and yet in fact they are unable to exercise that right. The frustration that gives rise to a desire for revenge is built into one's inability to exercise one's legitimate rights, while in Nietzsche's context this desire arises wherever there is a de facto inequality and characterises the "natural" view of those at the receiving end of any relationship. Scheler's concept of resentment is socially refined and, in my view, thus far more sophisticated.

Where one's position in relation to those of others is seen as unfair, or harmful, in a lasting sense, where there is a felt inability to change that

relationship to what is perceived to be desirable and “just”, or “right”, the feeling of resentment develops.

Yet, Max Scheler does consider the psychological dimension of resentment. While, on the social level, social injustices increase the likelihood of resentment and resentful action by those who are oppressed, on a personal level there are numerous situations of “natural” or de facto inferiority, which cannot be shifted by changes in the external world or in external relationships. For example, physical disabilities threaten one’s self-perception in ways that inevitably produce resentment towards those who are not so debilitated. This accounts for permanent resentment that structurally determines human relationships.

Both Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s views set the concept of resentment in a context that delineates the limits of human ability to affirm positive values and remove resentment, envy, hatred and revolt by creating more “just” arrangements. According to Nietzsche, for human who nurtures resentment this becomes a necessary ingredient of his nature. According to Scheler, this is the opposite of the truth. The difference is that, for Nietzsche, morality rests inside one; it is a reflection and exteriorisation of one’s inner feelings and aspirations and it arises from resentment of the existing order of things.

Scheler has quite a different concept of morality. For him, only a pathological, distorted view is able to see morality as arising from oneself. Morality is based on external, albeit internalised, values and systems of norms. One builds one’s standards and expectations on the basis of such external values. Morality thus determines the inner dynamics of one’s perceptions of external relations, and, even more importantly, it enables one to pass value judgments concerning the external relations. It is impossible to judge in the proper sense without an external set of criteria, and without a sense of objectivity of one’s judgment. An unlimited spontaneity in judging according to inner impulses, comfortably coated in the presumption of total egoism that is reflected in an “innate”. “Will to Power” is in fact a negation of responsibility, and thus also, in an important sense, a negation of morally accountable individual freedom. Nietzsche’s philosophy is in an important sense an anti-philosophy. It is an affirmation of instinct as the founding principle of one’s interactions, a negation of the ability to govern oneself on the basis of mutualness and

collectively binding and recognisable norms. In fact, in a true "genealogical" sense, Nietzsche postulates the human being, the deontic, particular individual human being as being prior to the morality itself, thus denying the ability of morality to play a formative role in the generation of one's inner value judgments. Furthermore, it is even unclear in Nietzsche's philosophy whether value judgments as such as possible at all, whether they make sense in the dardels of nihilism that he puts forward as a substitute of socially acceptable and recognisable morality. There is no possibility to "chain" the "me, myself and I", and why should there be such possibility when "me, myself and I" denotes the only "healthy" sphere of existence.

Scheler argues that resentment can colour one's perceptions of morality only in situations where there is an illusion of values, an inner distortion of values, so that values are no longer perceived as importantly relational, based on recognised relations between various entitlements and rights that belong to human beings, but rather as unconditionally arising from the inner impulses and desires. Nietzsche disregards the structure of frustration, and the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate, "right" and "wrong" structures and occurrences of frustration of the presupposed desire for power. For him, entitlements are not socially definable - they stem from the inner structure of the human mind. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction of desires is thus unconditional. Norms and entitlements, at least seemingly, do not play a role. However, Nietzsche recognised the need for objective external standards that found morality. Speaks of "falsification of value tables", in his overwhelming desire to overturn the existing order of values and undermine the exteriorities that seem to him to found these "tables" and to be oppressive to human nature. In his critique of him, Scheler point out the old argument that has been used throughout the history of philosophy. However, this very utterance presupposes that there are the "true tables" as well, and given that they are "value tables", they are not merely results of inner impulses, or "otherwise, there would be nothing but a struggle of value systems". They have an external dimension of validity, and thus an important intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, we are faced with the fact that there is no plausibility in the evaluation according to the credo "there can be only one" - and that one is the one of my own

concept. The moment one recognises the intersubjective nature of norms, one is immediately outside the realm of value nihilism and a completely internal domain of justification of actions and feelings. If we have value tables, and we clearly do, then resentment is most certainly not the source of all morality. It is in this aspect that Scheler rightly points out that Nietzsche logically simply *cannot be* right, that is, that his views *cannot be* plausible, because “the true and objective values are always present behind the illusory ones”. From this springs Scheler’s evaluation of Nietzsche’s concept - the source of resentment is rightly designated but the conclusions are not “genuine”.

The crucial relationship in any morality is that of *external obligation*. One acts morally if one fully recognises and implements in one’s actions the external obligation to standards and criteria that constitute the proper normative framework for an external evaluation of one’s actions (and/or one’s “character”, conceived as a totality of one’s actions and motivations for those actions). Morality is thus essentially external, or more precisely, it is a relationship between inner motives and externalities that are importantly intersubjective. There is reason to argue that a completely inner morality is not conceivable. This is an argument similar to that applied in contemporary analytic philosophy to the concept of a “private language”. Would a “language”, a system of codes and symbols that would be fully private, or known to only one individual, the one who “owns” that language, be considered a language at all, even if by all formal features it fitted into the concept of language, apart from its inter-subjectivity? Such a system would not be a language because language has profoundly conventional character. The same argument can be applied to an inner morality. A morality that involved no external obligation, that were completely based on internal urges and impulses, even if they are broadly founded in an anthropologically conceived structure of spontaneity of human action, would hardly be a morality at all, largely because it would not be recognisable as conforming to any set of norms on an inter-subjective level.

Nietzsche’s concept of resentment arises from a philosophical position that can be described as an anti-morality since it is well-founded in skepticism in ethics. However, as was already said, Nietzsche defends this view by claiming that the existing dominant morality is “false”. The

standard "false coin - genuine coin" argument applies - if this morality is "wrong", then it can only be so judged by the standards of another, supposedly "right" morality, but nevertheless, importantly, still a morality, that is, still inter-subjective. In the XX century, Gilbert Ryle used the same argument to criticise epistemological scepticism: If accepted truths can be falsified - that is, if they can be proven to be wrong - then epistemological scepticism must be defeated, because if some propositions are wrong, this implies that there are right propositions, which implies that there is a possibility of knowledge of reality, which - in itself - is the anti-scepticist thesis. I recognize a metaphorical value in the establishing of the relation between epistemological skepticism being equivalent to moral skepticism.

Scheler uses almost exactly the same argument against Nietzsche. He starts from the assumption that social interactions are a reality. Withdrawal from those interactions in the normative sense - in a word, withdrawal from external morality that makes social interaction possible - is nothing other but an anti-social stance. While this stance is perhaps philosophically acceptable on a level of general moral or anti-moral positions, it is logically unsustainable in the strict sense. Nietzsche here is a romantic naturalist: his views call for a rejection of intersubjectivity, and an affirmation of internal subjective impulses as a general norm. Yet, subjective impulses cannot possibly be a general norm, for the existence of a generality of any norm presupposes an external order within which it is possible for something to be a norm. To be a norm, a proposition must have a relationship of external obligation to internal motivations. This is one contradiction. Another contradiction lies in the fact that in this way one is reduced to arguing for an universalisation of subjectivity on the basis of the view that such subjectivity, internal impulse, the desire for power, can be found in every human being *in virtue of* them being human (the strong anthropological thesis).

It would seem that what Nietzsche tries to do is describe an underlying reality. According to him, resentment as omnipresent, is the source of all morality, and all other conceptions of morality are distortions of its structure and sublimations of its real nature. Goodness is weakness, mercy is impotence, etc.

The small step that Scheler makes in “socializing” Nietzsche's observations about resentment have far reaching and devastating implications for Nietzsche's views. On the one hand, one may observe many regularities that confirm Nietzsche's views. Indeed, resentment does govern a good part of the most widespread moral and quasi-moral sentiments. Indeed, those with physical disadvantages sometimes show seemingly unprovoked resentment towards those who are not so disabled, which suggests that inferiority is the source of sublimations of the raw desire to revenge against one's own position and inferiority relationship with others. However, Scheler suggests that we should look closer into the actual dynamics of revenge, primarily in the area of societal repression: “Quite independently of the characters and experiences of individuals, a potent charge of resentment is accumulated by the very structure of society”.

If resentment is the greatest where the gap between legitimate entitlements arising from the perceptions of what is “right” (fundamentally based on an external moral obligation, characteristic of conventional morality) is the broadest, then resentment is only secondary to the internalisation of moral values, or at least it is not exclusively and unequivocally “primal”. This is where Scheler's interpretation makes the crucial step towards making possible a socially meaningful treatment of resentment (“it has the specific value delusion”), both in its relationship with conventional morality and in its relevance for the social understanding of human motivations. He is interested to point out how resentment is inspiring and how it vanishes in the presence of genuine. Both authors talk in either/or terms but for Scheler there is a way not to fall into the trap of resentment, like when he is discussing resentment danger in the older generation's relation with the younger. This way is to compensate for what has been lost. This idea is opposed to Nietzsche's view that only plebeian would subscribe to compensation. In this sense, Scheler re-shaped Nietzsche's concept of resentment.

Max Scheler has re-shaped Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of resentment, by taking from it all that is “true about resentment in Nietzsche's explanation”, “fruitfully” criticizing what is “false” and “unjustified” in those explanations, and, finally, illuminating difficulties in rooting resentment exclusively in an amoral, or even anti-moral, purely internal structures of reactions to the world and its values. After concluding that is fact that,

apart from merely being there, often at least seemingly in accordance with the principles espoused by Nietzsche, Scheler offered “right” information about resentment - resentment escalates in reverse proportion with the degree of fulfillment of inter-subjective, morality- and legitimacy-based entitlements.

Imaginary victory over one's oppressors is for Nietzsche the genealogy of morals in general, the wellspring of transcendent values and of all religiosity, the metaphysically deferred vengeance of the defeated against their vanquishers.

The perplexing fact about the “terrorist” attacks is that they do not fit our standard opposition of Evil as egotism, as disregard for the common Good, and Good as the spirit of (and actual readiness for) the sacrifice for some higher Cause: terrorists cannot but appear as something akin to John Milton's Satan with his “Evil, be thou my Good”: while they pursue (what appears to us) evil goals with evil means, the very form of their activity meets the highest standard of the Good. The resolution of this enigma is easy, known already to Jean Jacques Rousseau: egotism (the concern for one's well-being) is not opposed to common good, since altruistic norms can easily be deduced from egotist concerns (Ansell-Pearson, K., 1996). Individualism versus communitarianism, utilitarianism versus universal normativism, are false oppositions, since the two opposed options amount to the same as to their result. The critics who complain how, in today's hedonistic-egotistic society, true values are lacking, totally miss the point: the true opposite of egotist self-love is not altruism, concern for common Good, but envy, resentment, which makes me act against my own interests. Sigmund Freud already knew it: death-drive is opposed to pleasure principle as well as to reality principle, i.e., the true “Evil” (death drive) involves self-sabotage, it makes us act against our own interests. Saint Augustin knew it so well - recall the passage from his *Confessions*, the scene of a baby jealous for his brother sucking the mother's breast (“I myself have seen and known an infant to be jealous though it could not speak. It became pale, and cast bitter looks on its foster-brother”.)

Based on previously presented insight, majority of late XX century French intellectuals convincingly criticize John Rawls's theory of justice: in the

Rawls' model of a just society, social inequalities are tolerated only insofar as they are based on natural inequalities, which are considered contingent, not merits. What Rawls doesn't see is how such a society would create conditions for an uncontrolled explosion of resentment: in it, I would know that my lower status is fully "justified", and would thus be deprived of excusing my failure as the result of social injustice. Rawls thus proposes a terrifying model of a society in which hierarchy is directly legitimized in natural properties, thereby missing the simple lesson of an anecdote about a Slovene peasant who is given a choice by a good witch: she will either give him one cow, and to his neighbour two cows, or take from him one cow, and from his neighbour two cows - the peasant immediately chooses the second option. (In a more morbid version, the witch tells him: "I will do to you whatever you want, but I warn you, I will do it to your neighbour twice!" The peasant, with a cunning smile, asks her: "Take one of my eyes!")

Friedrich Hayek knew that it is much easier to accept inequalities if one can claim that they result from an impersonal blind force, so the good thing about "irrationality" of the market success or failure in capitalism (recall the old motif of market as the modern version of the imponderable Fate) is that it allows me precisely to perceive my failure (or success) as "undeserved", contingent. The fact that capitalism is not "just" is thus a key feature that makes it palpable to the majority (I can accept much more easily my failure if I know that it is not due to my inferior qualities, but to chance).

What Nietzsche and Freud share is the idea that justice as equality is founded on envy - on the envy of the Other who has what we do not have, and who enjoys it; the demand for justice is thus ultimately the demand that the excessive enjoyment of the Other should be curtailed, so that everyone's access to *jouissance* should be equal (*jouissance* is a French term which can be roughly translated as "enjoyment" and is contrasted with *plaisir*. In every sense of the word, it is whatever "gets you off"). The necessary outcome of this demand, of course, is asceticism: since it is not possible to impose equal *jouissance*, what one can impose is only the equally shared prohibition. However, one should not forget that today, in our allegedly permissive society, this asceticism assumes precisely the form of its opposite, of the generalised superego injunction "Enjoy!".

We are all under the spell of this injunction, with the outcome that our enjoyment is more hindered than ever - recall the yuppie who combines Narcissistic "Self-Fulfillment" with utter ascetic discipline of jogging, eating health food, etc. This, perhaps, is what Nietzsche had in mind with his notion of the Last Man - it is only today that we can really discern the contours of the Last Man, in the guise of the hedonistic asceticism of yuppies. Nietzsche thus does not simply urge life-assertion against asceticism: he is well aware how a certain asceticism is the obverse of the decadent excessive sensuality - therein resides his criticism of Wagner's *Parsifal*, and, more generally, of the late Romantic decadence oscillating between damp sensuality and obscure spiritualism.

To define envy, we should recall again the Augustinian scene of a sibling envying his brother who is sucking the mother's breast: the subject does not envy the Other's possession of the prized object as such, but rather the way the Other is able to enjoy this object - which is why it is not enough for him simply to steal and thus gain possession of the object: his true aim is to destroy the Other's ability/capacity to enjoy the object. As such, envy is to be located into the triad of envy, thrift and melancholy, the three forms of not being able to enjoy the object (and, of course, reflexively enjoying this very impossibility). In contrast to the subject of envy, who envies the other's possession and/or *jouissance* of the object, the miser possesses the object, but cannot enjoy/consume it - his satisfaction derives from just possessing it, elevating it into a sacred, untouchable/prohibited, entity which should under no conditions be consumed (recall the proverbial figure of the lone miser who, upon returning home, safely locks the doors, opens up his chest and then takes the secret peek at his prized object, observing it in awe); this very hindrance that prevents the consummation of the object guarantees its status of the object of desire. The melancholic subject, like the miser, possesses the object, but loses the cause that made him desire it: this figure, most tragic of them all, has free access to all he wants, but finds no satisfaction in it.

This excess of envy is the base of Rousseau's well-known, but nonetheless not fully exploited, distinction between egotism, *amour-de-soi* (which natural), and *amour-propre*, the perverted preferring of oneself to others

in which I focus not on achieving the goal, but on destroying the obstacle to it:

“The primitive passions, which all directly tend towards our happiness, make us deal only with objects which relate to them, and whose principle is only *amour de soi*, are all in their essence lovable and tender; however, when, diverted from their objects by obstacles, they are more occupied with the obstacle they try to get rid of, than with the object they try to reach, they change their nature and become irascible and hateful. This is how *amour de soi*, which is a noble and absolute feeling, becomes *amour-propre*, that is to say, a relative feeling by means of which one compares oneself, a feeling which demands preferences, whose enjoyment is purely negative and which does not strive to find satisfaction in our own well-being, but only in the misfortune of others.”

For Rousseau, an evil person is not an egotist, “thinking only about his own interests”: a true egotist is all too busy with taking care of his own good to have time to cause misfortunes to others, while the primary vice of a bad person is precisely that he is more occupied with others than with himself. Rousseau describes a precise libidinal mechanism: the inversion which generates the shift of the libidinal investment from the object to the obstacle itself. This is why egalitarianism itself should never be accepted at its face value: the notion (and practice) of egalitarian justice, insofar as it is sustained by envy, relies on the inversion of the standard renunciation accomplished to benefit others: “I am ready to renounce it, so that others will (also) not (be able to) have it”! Far from being opposed to the spirit of sacrifice, Evil is thus the very spirit of sacrifice, ready to ignore one's own well-being - if, through my sacrifice, I can deprive the Other of his *jouissance*. Is this sad fact that the opposition to the system cannot articulate itself in the guise of a realistic alternative, or at least a meaningful utopian project, but only as a meaningless outburst, not the strongest indictment of our predicament? Where is here the celebrated freedom of choice, when the only choice is the one between playing by the rules and (self)destructive violence, a violence which is almost exclusively directed against one's own - the cars burned and the schools torched were not from rich neighbourhoods, but were part of the hard-won acquisitions of the very strata from which protesters originate.

Stemming from the previously outlined, the notion of evaluation seems to be crucial for the functioning of a democratic society: if, at the level of their symbolic identity, all subjects are equal, if, here, if they can be indefinitely substituted to each other, since each of them is reduced to an empty punctual place (\$), to a “man without qualities-properties”, if, consequently, every reference to their property symbolic mandate is prohibited, how then, are they to be distributed within the social edifice, how can their occupation be legitimized? The answer imposing itself is, evaluation: one has to evaluate - as objectively as possible, and through all possible means, from quantified testing of their abilities to more “personalised” in-depth interviews - their potentials. The underlying ideal notion is to produce their characterization deprived of all traces of symbolic identities. Here the standard Leftist critics who denounce the hidden cultural bias of evaluations and tests miss the point: the problem with evaluation, with its total objectivation of criteria, is not that it is unjust, but precisely that it is just in it's essence.

What this means is that the “deconstructionist”/“risk society” commonplace according to which the contemporary individual experiences himself as thoroughly denaturalized, that he experiences even his most “natural” features (from his ethnic identity to his sexual preferences) as something chosen, historically contingent, to be learned, is profoundly deceiving: what we are effectively witnessing today is the opposite process of an unheard-of re-naturalization: all big “public issues” are (re)translated into questions about the regulation and stances towards intimate “natural”/“personal” idiosyncrasies. This is also why, at a more general level, the pseudo-naturalized ethnico-religious conflicts are the form of struggle which fits global capitalism: in our age of “post-politics”, when politics proper is progressively replaced by expert social administration, the only remaining legitimate source of conflicts are cultural (religious) or natural (ethnic) tensions. “Evaluation” is, precisely, the regulation of social promotion that fits this massive renaturalisation. So, perhaps, the time has come to reassert, as the truth of evaluation, the perverted logic of commodity fetishism: Today, in our times of evaluation, to be a computer expert or a successful manager is a gift of nature, while to have a beautiful lips or eyes is a fact of culture.

IN SEARCH OF AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Typically listed “roots” of terrorism are: religious fundamentalism, resentment, history of violence, lack of power and resources (such as a national military which has the capacity to challenge the enemy), poverty, psychology.

Typically listed “fruits” of terrorism are: innocent death of civilians, the creation of fear to make a public statement (terrorist activities are designed to be seen by others, not only to be felt by the victims), unpredictable violence, inexpensive methods of causing destruction, martyrdom.

Recent historical events confirm that strategies, actions and policies employed for a specific purpose create new unanticipated problems (the rise of bin Laden and Sadaam Hussein). Catastrophic blowbacks have already been experienced to certain extent. From a psychological perspective, much blowback is predictable and preventable. Taking the perspective of the other, empathy, following consequences through time, avoiding humiliation, addressing suffering, despair, poverty, culture, and designing win-win strategies, using language, policies and interventions that give hope and reduce tension go a long way in reducing violence.

There is a belief that if others are afraid of our power they will submit to our demands and we will be safer. This works under specific conditions, but not others, and is risky with weapons of mass destruction. It is a psychological fact that people are most dangerous when they are afraid, even more than when they are angry. We, too, are more dangerous when we are afraid. Also, keeping in mind that envy and humiliation are highly associated with violence and the breakdown of deterrence, strategies should be designed to reduce fear and provide assurances, US unilateralism, in its disregard of global community is causing a range of problematic emotional reactions around the world, including resentment, fear, hatred, anxiety, terror, dread, envy, humiliation, intimidation, anger, rage, insult, and a healthy desire for a respectful responsiveness which, if not met will naturally drive others, in desperation, towards a desire for revenge. This endangers US citizens.

Policies, strategies, and language organized around one's own security needs and sense of rightness with no consciousness about how these are experienced and received by other actors. Making incorrect assumptions about the psychology of the other, i.e., assuming deterrence will work, imposing demands and ultimata, when defiance to greater power is valued in a culture.

Terrorism is a form of asymmetrical warfare. Arms proliferation is a response to asymmetry. Power imbalances are unstable in the long term. Domination, oppression, humiliation, and suffering provoke the desire to even the scales as we see in universal myths like David and Goliath. As 9/11 shows, there is no amount of power that cannot be turned against any target.

Psychological techniques induce us to accept the absurd as rational. The use of an exaggerated, distorted image of the enemy, disinformation, misinformation, and censorship, play on fear and use fear to justify foreign and domestic policy. This keeps us ignorant and precludes balanced, complex thinking about less dangerous strategies. Flawed concepts and dismissals such as the need to maintain a "credible threat", "the only language they understand is force", and deterrence theory mystify us into believing that these are proven concepts that work all the time. False beliefs such as there are no effective alternatives to military solutions ("we have no choice, they will attack us if we are perceived as weak, we must show resolve, etc.") divert us from enlightened action.

"Conscious Politics" comprises many concepts such as "political wisdom" or "political maturity" that labels policies transcending particular interests, dualistic thinking, and consider optimal, win-win strategies with long-term benefit.

In the world of today, in order to find balanced response to terrorism different responses are sought. The prevailing ones are military, legal, and peacemaking models of response.

The current military model of response to international violence and terrorism endorses a theory the current Bush Administration calls pre-emption - attack the enemy because they might attack us. It believes that unilateralism (acting individually without the support of other

nations) is often necessary. A military model believes that power, a large weapons arsenal, and a willingness to use military might are deterrents to violence. It defines an enemy and believes the enemy must be eradicated.

The only responsible legal response to the attacks is the strengthening, differentiation, institutionalization and enforcement of international law (Borradori G., 2004). A law enforcement model of response to international violence and terrorism endorses a theory of international cooperation. It supports entities like the United Nations and the work of international inspectors. A law enforcement model is based upon the rule of law as the guiding principle in interactions among nations, and focuses on controlling and minimizing criminal activity.

A peacemaking model of response to international violence and terrorism endorses the belief that reconciliation between leaders and nations is possible. It emphasizes the importance of international standards for human rights and seeks to prevent the root causes of terrorism. It calls for a reduction in the trading of weapons. It believes rehabilitation of the enemy is possible.

If resentment remains to be in the core of understanding terrorism, one way or the other (as “root” or as “fruit”), it appears that any sustainable strategy to deal with terrorism in XXI century has to start with the reconstruction of legitimacy both through the re-establishment of rule of law and through more inclusive ideologies that offer an alternative to extremism. Any actions therefore taken to deal with terrorism have to be undertaken within the framework of international law and have to be aimed at countering the ideology of ‘fear and hatred’ with a genuine effort to win ‘hearts and minds’. Such efforts must be made as acts of “conscious politics” created on the basis of political wisdom” or “political maturity” that labels policies transcending particular interests, dualistic thinking, and consider optimal, win-win strategies with long-term benefit.

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REVOLT I TERORIZAM : KORENI I PLODOVI

U kontekstu napora da se, u odgovoru na terorističke napade i strah od terorizma, formira odgovarajuća međunarodna i nacionalna politika, u tekstu su razmatrani različiti koncepti revolta pojmovno određenog kroz široki dijapazon osećanja koja uključuju mržnju ogorčenost, antipatiju, nesviđanje itd. Naime, bez obzira na neslaganje među teoretičarima ali i među onima koji politički odlučuju, a koje postoji u savremenom diskursu u pogledu pozicioniranja u vremenu spram terorizma (da li je terorizam posledica ili je terorizam uzrok), revolt se tipično navodi kao koncept ključan za razumevanje terorizma. Putem skiciranja nekih različitih pristupa određenju koncepta revolta, autorka nastoji da ukaže na to da je multidisciplinarni pristup u izučavanju ove pojave neophodan za kreiranje efikasne i održive antiterorističke politike.

KLJUČNE REČI: terorizam / revolt / društveni odnosi / politika