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RELATIONS BETWEEN RADICAL BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS: THE MEDIATING ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES' EVALUATIONS*

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This research aimed to investigate the specific relations of radical beliefs (operationalized through militant-extremists mindset - MEM), evaluation of different Serbian political parties and the anti-immigrant attitude. We hypothesize positive relations of all three aspects of the MEM (Proviolence, Vile World, and Divine Power) and positive evaluation of conservative parties to the anti-immigrant attitude, and a negative relation of a preference for liberal parties with the anti-immigrant attitude. We also expect that relations between radical beliefs and the anti-immigrant attitude will be mediated by the evaluations of political parties. The sample included 486 respondents. The expected relations of the MEM and evaluations of the both conservative and liberal political parties with the anti-immigrants attitude were detected. Additionally, the results showed that Proviolence and Divine Power had a direct pathway toward the anti-immigrant attitude, while the effects of the all three MEM aspects were mediated by the political evaluations. The evaluation of conservative parties increases, while the evaluation of liberal parties decreases their effects on the attitude toward immigrants. The results contribute to the understanding of the reaction of domiciles in Serbia to immigrants, and, consequently, they represent relevant information to consider during the creation of national and local policies towards immigrants.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The current migrant crisis across Europe is one of the biggest challenges European countries are facing, including Serbia. It generated various attitudes towards immigrants and their integration, but recent research shows that negative attitudes are increasing (Ceobanu, Excandell, 2010; Denda, 2014). Previous research had shown that conservative ideological orientation contributes to the development of negative attitudes towards immigrants (Petrović, 2017), the development of the ideologically-radical belief (Mededović, Petrović, 2016; Stankov, 2018), and also to supporting right-wing parties (Petrović, Mededović, 2017). This research aimed to investigate specific relations of radical beliefs (operationalised through militant-extremists mindset - MEM), preferences for different political parties and the anti-immigrants attitude.

1.1 Attitudes toward immigrants: between care and violence

The mass influx of immigrants from the Middle Eastern and North African countries lead to the more negative attitudes toward them (Denda, 2014). The studies about domicile's attitudes toward immigrants resulted in mainly congruent findings – even before the emergence of the migrant crisis in Europe, both in the Western- and in the Eastern-European countries, including Serbia, immigrants were seen as one of the most unpopular social groups (Todosijević, 2018).

In this context, the immigration issue is always an important political issue for every country, an issue often focused on by conservative, right-wing populist parties, which create their politics based on the broad sentiment and attitudes toward immigrants (Green, Sarrasin, Baur, & Fasel, 2016). The current migrant crisis provoked different responses from European countries, including European Union Member States – some of the Union took very restrictive steps and created a restrictive policy to prevent the entry of illegal migrants. Analogous to state-scale policies, the reactions and attitudes toward immigrants of European citizens varied from acceptance and providing assistance, to extremely negative attitudes and even violent behaviors toward them (Bobić, 2013; Ceobanu, Excandell, 2010; Denda, 2014; Šinković, 2017). Even in Serbia where, unlike most other European countries, the immigrant crisis is not politicized, and their visual representation in media is not entirely negative (Kleut, Drašković, 2017), numerous examples of expressing intolerance and violent behavior toward them were registered. Multiple activities directed against immigrants were organized and conducted, prevalently close to asylum centers: protests - justified by beliefs that immigrants were armed with knives,

that they will attack local girls, that children are afraid and may not go to school, as well as stoning the houses or burning the barracks in which immigrants were staying with the justification that they rob and steal, etc. It is also important to note that in places that have no asylum centers, where people have a reduced possibility to make contact with immigrants, negative stereotypes still prevailed (Denda, 2014).

1.2 Attitudes toward immigrants and their determinants: potential role of radical beliefs

Negative attitudes and readiness to show violence toward immigrants (and any other outgroups) are often explained by integrated threat theory (Stephan, et al., 2005). This theory proposes that the reactions of domiciles toward people from different cultures were caused by a perception of realistic (i.e., threats to physical safety, health, threats to the existence of the group) and symbolic (the feeling of threat by the cultural and social identity) threat from an out-group. But, various research showed that people differ in their attitude toward outgroups – in the case of immigrants, a number of people have negative attitudes and advocate restrictive and aggressive politics and behavior, but a part of the population has pro-social attitudes and actively provides support to the immigrants. Therefore, it is reasonable to seek an answer to the question what determines the attitudes towards immigrants. Previous research suggested that social attitudes, like conservatism, nationalism, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), or social dominance orientation (SDO), could probably be the most important predictors of prejudices and attitudes toward immigrants and other out-groups (Bello, 2016; Breznau, Danielson, 2014; Dinesen, Klemmensen, & Norgaard, 2016; Jaime-Castillo, Marqués-Perales, & Álvarez-Gálvez, 2015; Petrović, 2017). In accordance, some studies showed that the SDO is positively associated with the advocacy of adopting more stringent immigration laws independently of the countries and cultures, while right-wing authoritarianism plays a similar role, but the behavior is only conducted within their own country (Craig, Richeson, 2014).

Besides the attitudes toward outgroups, conservative attitudinal orientation is also the foundation of radicalization and development of radical beliefs' patterns of thinking (Borum, 2014; Međedović, Petrović, 2016). Why have we postulated a problem of extremist, radical groups here? Doosje and colleagues defined radicalization as a “process through which people become increasingly motivated to use violent means against members of an out-group or symbolic targets to achieve behavioral change and political goals” (Doosje, et al., 2016). Having in mind that immigrants represent an out-group for the European citizens, that has been perceived primarily as a symbolic threat (Hainmueller, Hopkins, 2014), and bearing in mind that domiciles increasingly became more motivated for violence toward immigrants, it is reasonable to designate this process as radicalization.

One of the rare attempts to conceptualize and operationalize radical, extremist patterns of thinking is known as the Militant-Extremists Mindset (MEM). This model proposes that militant extremist thinking can be seen as a representation of three broad factors: (a) Proviolence—the justification or advocacy of violence as a means of ideological goal attainment; (b) Vile World—seeing the world as an evil, unjust, and miserable place; and (c) Divine Power—supernatural forces or utopian ideology that can serve as a cause and rationale for extremist acts (Stankov, Saucier, Knežević, 2010). This model was conceptualized on the basis of analysis of different sources that were produced by the various militant, extremist and terrorist groups worldwide (Saucier, et al., 2009). But, previous findings showed that the militant extremist thinking pattern is not only typical for terrorist groups, but also exists in the general population (Stankov et al., 2010; Stankov, et al., 2018), with somewhat less pronounced Proviolence. The model also proposed that all three relatively independent aspects of MEM must be elevated to induce a possibility for militant extremist behavior, i.e., radicalization, which practically means that Proviolence has a crucial role in this concept. More precisely, without Proviolence, there will be no violence toward outgroups.

1.3 Immigrants and radicalization in Europe: the rising of radical right-wing politics

In the previous chapter we argued that, under perception of immigrant threat, domicile people, primarily those with conservative, nationalistic attitudinal orientation, have a tendency to become radicalized (accept radical ideas and develop a militant-extremist mindset) and to advocate restrictive policies and even violence toward immigrants (Petrović, 2017; Stockemer, 2016). In this context, it is necessary to note that with the increasing of the migration crisis in Europe (and the influx of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa), support to European (and not only European) radical right-wing parties also increased (Green, et al., 2016; Rydgren, 2017). Some studies showed that radical right-wing parties have not driven the rise in anti-immigration attitudes (probably because relatively small, although increasing, support; Bohman, Hjerm, 2016). However, there is a larger number of studies that argued that one of the important consequences of the rising of radical right-wing political parties is exactly the shifting toward a more anti-immigrant attitudinal position of the citizens (see, e.g., Green, et al., 2016; Muis, Immerzeel, 2017). Many scholars also argued that anti-immigration policies are one of the several milestones of radical right-wing parties (Grečić, Korać, 2012; Bonikowski, 2017). Currently, numerous right-wing parties in Europe focus on anti-immigrant issues, they are common known as “anti-immigrant parties” (Muis, Immerzeel, 2017). Finally, there are a number of empirically-based arguments that radical right-wing parties affect the attitudes of the citizens. For example, Schmuck and Matthes showed that right-wing populist parties use advertisements that depict symbolic and economic threats posed by immigrants, which lead to the significant

increasing of negative attitudes towards immigrants (Schmuck, Matthes, 2015). They also showed that populist ads strengthened intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes for voters, which, in turn, led to more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Matthes, Schmuck, 2015). Wirz and colleagues showed that anti-immigrant statements in the media lead to more negative cognitions toward immigrants, while populist content leads to more negative emotional reactions of the citizens (Wirz, et al., 2018).

The situation in Serbia is somewhat different that in other parts of Europe in terms of immigrants and immigration policies. On one hand, the Serbian Government advocates and implements one humanitarian approach toward immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, organizing the admission and transfer of immigrants to the EU countries and cooperating with other countries from the Western Balkan route, as well as the European Union and some of the EU member states (Tatalović, Malnar, 2016). But, the implementation of such a policy is based on the awareness that immigrants perceive Serbia as a transit country and do not intend to stay in it – despite of a increasing number of people who express the intention to seek asylum in Serbia, the proportion of submitted claims remains small (Lukić, 2016). This is also one of the main reasons why anti-immigrant narrative did not become an important topic in the politics of (radical) right-wing political parties in Serbia (except attempts of some parties like Dveri to organize anti-migrant protests), unlike many other European countries (Spasojević, 2017). But, it does not mean that the anti-immigrant issue will not became important for Serbian right-wing parties, if social changes engender that immigrants begin being perceived as more of a threat to the majority of the Serbian population (Bonikowski, 2017).

1.4 The present study

Previous studies suggested that the associations between radical beliefs, support to certain political parties, primarily right-wing parties, and attitudes toward immigrants have one common core – conservative attitudinal (ideological) orientation. But, there is the lack of empirical support for the associations between them. This research aimed to investigate specific relations of radical beliefs (operationalised through militant-extremists mindset - MEM), preferences for political parties and the anti-immigrants attitude. We hypothesize that: 1) all three aspects of the MEM (Proviolence, Vile World, and Divine Power) and a preference for conservative parties will be positively related, while preference for liberal parties will be negatively related to the anti-immigrants attitude, 2) that political preferences will mediate the relations between MEM and attitudes toward immigrants, whereby 3) conservative party preferences will facilitate, while a preference for liberal parties will reduce the effects of radical beliefs on attitudes toward immigrants.

2. METHOD

2.1. Sample and procedure

The research was conducted on a sample of 486 respondents from the student population in Serbia (74% females, mean age 21.96 years, SD=2.71). Data was collected via on-line study. Participants were motivated to participate by a possibility to receive feedback regarding their results on the administrated questionnaires, an opportunity which most of them used. The informed consent was present on the first page of the questionnaire.

2.2 Measures

Attitude toward immigrants was operationalised through an two-item measure. These two items were: “Foreigners and immigrants have a beneficial effect on our society”, on which respondents gave their answers on a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*), and “In your opinion, to what extent should Serbia allow people from other countries, regardless of skin color, nationality or country of origin, to immigrate, live and work in Serbia?”. In this case, participants rate the item on a 5-point scale (1 = *Do not allow anyone*, 5 = *Allow all who want to come, live and work here*). Before the calculation of the total score, having in mind the nature of the predictor variables, the items are recoded (to express anti-immigrant attitude) and standardized. The coefficient of correlation between these two items is .28 ($p < .001$).

Militant-Extremists Mindset was measured by the MEM Scale (Stankov, et al., 2010), which operationalised all three aspects of MEM. The Proviolence scale has 10 items (e.g., “If violence does not solve problems, it is because there was not enough of it”), the Vile World scale has 6 items (e.g., “The present-day world is vile and miserable”), and the Divine Power scale has 8 items (e.g., “At a critical moment, a divine power will step in to help our people”). MEM Scale use a standard Likert response scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Evaluation of the political parties was operationalised through the following question: “How do you assess the general work of the following political parties?” The respondents submitted their responses on a five point scale (1 = *very poor*, 5 = *very good*). Previous research showed that this single question, which measures a performance of the parties, rather than feelings towards parties, is a valid measure of party evaluation (Međedović, Petrović, 2013; Petrović, Međedović, 2017). The evaluation of the largest parliamentary political parties in Serbia (the data were gathered during the 2014/15) was examined. These political parties were: Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Democratic Party (DS), United Regions of Serbia (URS), Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In addition to them, the work of the political parties that were actively present in the public life of Serbia was evaluated. A detailed list of all the political parties

that have been evaluated can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. With the aim to reduce the number of the political parties' evaluations to the number of components expected on the basis of previous research (Petrović, Mededović, 2017), the Principal Component analysis (PCA) was conducted, with Maximum Likelihood as method of component extraction; extracted components were rotated in Promax position. The PCA resulted in two factors (see Table A1 in the Appendix). The first one ($\lambda_1=9.07$, 53.4% of the variance) was interpreted as Socio-Liberal parties. The second one ($\lambda_2=1.66$, 9.8% of the variance) was labeled as the National-Conservative parties. Mean scores for these two variables were calculated and included in further analyses.

2.3 Data Analysis

We have calculated the descriptives, and conducted correlation and linear regression analyses. The attitude toward immigrants was entered as criterion, but MEM aspects and evaluations of political parties were entered as predictor variables in the regression models. The effects of gender and age of the respondents were controlled. To test the mediator role of preferences for political parties on the relations between radical (MEM) beliefs and attitude toward immigrants, the path analysis was set. Several fit indices were used to determine model fit: χ^2 , normed fit index – NFI, comparative fit index – CFI and root mean square error of approximation – RMSEA. Values of fit indices indicating good fit are: RMSEA < .06, NFI and CFI > .95), and acceptable fit: RMSEA < .08, NFI and CFI > .90 (see Hu, Bentler, 1999; Lazarević, 2008).

3. Results

3.1 Descriptive statistics, reliabilities and correlations between the examined variables

As it can be seen from Table 1, the reliabilities of all measures included in the study are good. As expected, bivariate correlations between all three MEM aspects are insignificant or positive and weak. Positive evaluations of both National-Conservative and Social-Liberal parties are highly correlated, which is somewhat surprising.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations between MEM aspects and evaluations of political parties

	M	SD	Correlations				
			1	2	3	4	5
1 Proviolence	1.60	.60	.83				

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 role of political parties' evaluations”, (str. 97-113)

2 Vile World	3.40	.79	.01	.82			
3 Divine Power	2.42	.79	.23**	.28**	.81		
4 National-Conservative parties	2.27	.81	.03	.08	.33**	.90	
5 Socio-Liberal parties	2.36	.76	-.14*	-.12**	.10*	.70**	.91

Notes: M – Mean; SD - Standard Deviation; α coefficients of reliability are shown in diagonal. * - $p < .05$; ** - $p < .01$

Negative correlations between Proviolence and Vile World with the evaluations of the Socio-Liberal parties were also expected, but a lack of associations between these two MEM aspects and preferences for National-Conservative parties were not expected. It is also interesting that Divine Power positively associated both with preferences for National-Conservative and Socio-Liberal parties.

3.2 Radical beliefs and evaluations of political parties as predictors of the attitude toward immigrants

Results of the regression analysis showed that the predictor variables, both radical beliefs and evaluations of political parties, explained 21% of the variance of attitudes toward immigrants (Table 2).

Table 2. MEM aspects and evaluations of political parties as predictors of the attitudes toward immigrants

	Attitude toward immigrants		
	β	t	r_o
Gender	-.01	-.34	-.10
Age	.02	.49	-.06
Proviolence	.26	5.93**	.35**
Vile World	.05	1.27	.14**
Divine Power	.19	4.17**	.30**
National-Conservative parties	.21	3.39**	.10*
Socio-Liberal parties	-.26	-4.28**	-.14**
R ²	.21		
F(7,477)	18.52**		

Notes: β – standardized regression coefficients; t-t-test; r_o – zero-order correlation; R² - percent of explained variance; * - $p < .05$; ** - $p < .01$

Proviolence and positive evaluations of National-Conservative parties, followed by Divine Power, are the strongest predictors, and they contributed positively to the prediction of the anti-immigrant attitude. Positive evaluations of Socio-

Liberal parties contributed negatively, as expected. It is interesting that Vile World, although it has no important role in this regression model, has positive zero-order correlation with anti-immigrant attitude.

3.3 Evaluations of political parties as mediators between radical beliefs and attitudes toward immigrants

We also hypothesize that the specific evaluations of political parties will mediate the relationships between militant-extremists beliefs (set as exogenous variables in the model) and the attitude toward immigrants (set as endogenous variables). The model, displayed at the Figure 1, showed adequate fit indices ($\chi^2=3.43$, $df=4$, $p \geq .01$; $NFI=.99$; $CFI=.99$; $RMSEA=.00$).




Figure 1. Evaluations of political parties as partial mediators of the relations between MEM aspects and attitudes toward immigrants. Non-significant paths are depicted with dashed lines. Figure values are standardized regression coefficients. *** - $p < .001$

The model showed that positive evaluations of both liberal and conservative political parties were related to the anti-immigrant attitude: the positive evaluation of National-Conservative parties associated positively, and of Socio-Liberal parties negatively with the anti-immigrant attitude. Provience and Divine Power had direct positive pathways toward anti-immigrant attitude. Additionally, all three MEM aspects had indirect pathways: both preferences of National-Conservative and Socio-Liberal parties increased the effect of Divine Power, while the preference of Socio-Liberal parties decreased effects of Provience and Vile World on negative attitudes toward immigrants. Therefore, only the effect of Vile World was fully mediated by the evaluation of Socio-Liberal parties.

DISCUSSION

During the last few decades, the Europe was faced with two important processes that could have strong impact on social, even societal processes in majority of European countries. First of them is massive influx of the immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, common known as European migrant crisis, which provoke polarized attitudes and reactions of European citizens: from acceptance and support to the violent acts toward immigrants. The second one is rising of radical right-wing political parties, which often based their identity on immigration issues and the anti-immigrant attitudes. Both of these processes are indicators of deeper process of radicalization of European citizens, and conservative attitudinal orientation is common basis for all of them. Although these processes are not so prominent in Serbia (for immigrants, Serbia is only transition country; formally, right-wing political parties in Serbia have restricted impact on Serbian politics and attitudes of the citizens), all of them are present. In this context, if expected results were given on the Serbian student sample, the registered effects could be stronger and the findings of this research could be more implicative for European countries.

Focused on relations between radical, militant-extremists beliefs, preferences of the political parties, and anti-immigrant attitudes, this research showed that radical beliefs, i.e., all three aspects of Militant-Extremists Mindset and preference of National-Conservative (i.e., right-wing) parties are related positively, but preference of Socio-Liberal parties - negatively with the anti-immigrant attitudes. The results also showed that preferences of political parties partly mediated the relationship between MEM aspects and anti-immigrant attitude. The results are in line with proposed hypotheses.

4.1 Militant-Extremists Mindset as disposition toward anti-immigrant attitude

We hypothesize that all three aspects of the MEM will be associated with the anti-immigrant attitude. The results of this research showed that all MEM aspects are positively associated with the anti-immigrant attitude. More concretely, the strongest associations are between Proviolence and Divine Power. Vile World is also positively associated with the anti-immigrant attitude, but its effect is much weaker, and practically insignificant in regression model. These results are expected, having in mind the starting point that both radical beliefs and anti-immigrant attitudes are expressions of common conservative-ideology basis (Bello, 2015; Breznau, Danielson, 2014; Dinesen, et al., 2016; Jaime-Castillo, et al., 2015; Međedović, Petrović, 2016).

But, more interesting, the findings that all three MEM aspects are engaged in understanding of the anti-immigrant attitude, and that Proviolence has the most prominent role, are the most interesting, having in mind some of the basic premises of the MEM model (Stankov, et al., 2010). The former finding suggests that anti-immigrant attitude could be characteristic for radicalized people (i.e.,

people with elevated score on all three MEM aspects). The latter one explained the facts that some people are ready to be violent toward immigrants (see, for example, Denda, 2014) even if they are faced only with the verbal statement which provoke possible symbolic threat. This finding is also in line with the integrative threat theory (Stephan, et al., 2005), and it could represent a kind of bridge that connects MEM model and integrative threat theory. Probably it could be said that conservative people, prone to be radicalized, became radicalized and violent toward immigrants when perceive symbolic threat by the immigrants (see, for example, Hainmueller, Hopkins, 2014; Stockemer, 2016).

4.2 Preferences of political parties and attitudes toward immigrants

The associations of anti-immigrant attitude with preferences of political parties, positive with preferences of National-Conservative parties and negative with preferences of Socio-Liberal parties, are also expected. Although some studies showed that neither the presence, the representational strength, nor the nationalistic framing of an radical right-wing parties affect opposition towards immigration (Bohman, Hjerm, 2016), other studies mainly have congruent findings about positive relations between support to right-wing parties and anti-immigrant attitude (Bonikowski, 2017; Green, et al., 2016; Muis, Immerzeel, 2017). These findings are additionally interesting having in mind that anti-immigrant issues are not in focus of Serbian right-wing parties (Spasojević, 2017). Although the stronger associations could be expected between more radical right-wing parties in many European countries that are faced with higher influx of immigrants, the fact that expected effects of political parties’ preferences to the anti-immigrant attitude is indicative.

These findings are also interesting having in mind that National-Conservative parties’ principal component is saturated, besides the radical right-wing parties as Dveri or Serbian Radical Party, with the Serbian progressive parties, Socialistic parties of Serbia and Unified Serbia. These parties are the majority in the Serbian Parliament and their members constitute the Government of Serbia. Consequently, they are responsible for humanitarian approach toward immigrants (Tatalović, Malnar, 2016). But, previous studies showed that these parties are also mainly supported by low-educated, conservative people, similarly as the Serbian radical right-wing parties, as Serbian Radical Party (Petrović, Mededović, 2017). Additionally, common feature of all these parties that constitute National-Conservative component is traditionalism. It is also obvious having in mind its positive correlation with Divine Power, the only one aspect of MEM with which they are associated. These findings suggested that all these Serbian right-wing parties have a potential to develop more negative politics and attitudes toward immigrants in slightly different social circumstances (Bonikowski, 2017).

4.3 Anti-immigrant attitude as correlate of radical beliefs mediated by the preferences of political parties

The findings that preferences of political parties mediate the relations between radical beliefs and anti-immigrant attitude are expected. More concretely, the effects of Proviolence and Divine Power are partly mediated, but the effect of Vile World is fully mediated by the preference of Socio-Liberal parties. These different pathways are understandable, having in mind proposed independence of the MEM aspects (Mededović, Petrović, 2016; Stankov, et al., 2010). Also, the fact that all three MEM aspects have important pathways partly supports the MEM model (Stankov, et al., 2010). However, only two of them have direct pathways, which is slightly opposed to the model.

It is interesting that both Proviolence and Divine Power have direct pathways toward anti-immigrant attitude. It could mean that anti-immigrant attitude will be advocated by people who believe in traditional and religious sources of authorities and who are prone to legitimize violence for achieving of their goals. This finding could explain readiness to violence with the aim to defend own cultural and social identity from the immigrants that are perceived as threat. As we noted earlier, these finding could be a bridge between MEM model and integrative threat theory (Stephan, et al., 2005).

All MEM scales, Proviolence, Divine Power, but also Vile World, have indirect pathways toward anti-immigrant attitude, and it is expected. But, it is unexpected that main mediation role has preference of Socio-liberal parties, primarily diminishing the effects of the Proviolence and Vile World. Previous studies mainly investigated relations between right-wing political parties and attitudes toward immigrants (Bohman, Hjerm, 2016; Green, et al., 2016; Rydgren, 2017). But, practically there are no studies about effects of the parties from the liberal or left political side on attitudes toward immigrants. Their role might be very important primarily for reduction of the negative effects of immigration crisis. But, this is the challenge for some future research.

Finally, it is interesting that only the effects of the Divine Power are mediated by preference of both National-Conservative and Socio-Liberal parties. And, in the case of both direct and indirect pathways on anti-immigrant attitude, its effects are positive. These findings could be understandable if we have in mind that Divine Power is highly correlated with the traditional religiosity (Mededović, Petrović, 2016; Stankov, et al., 2010). The positive links toward anti-immigrant attitude, mediated by the preference of National-Conservative parties could be expected – conservative people are also highly religious people, who have a need to defend their religious identity from the threat that immigrants represent. But, in Serbia, supporters of both national-conservative and socio-liberal parties are mainly religious. This is the psychological mechanism which could explain that right-wing populist governments of some European countries promote narrative about “saving the Europe's Christian identity” which is threaten by the Muslim

immigrants, but also that socio-liberal and socio-democratic parties in Europe do not oppose actively to this narrative.

4.4 Limitations and future directions

This research has several limitations. Firstly, the attitude toward immigrants was operationalised through two-item measure, with a limited range of responses. In some future studies, it would be necessary to measure attitudes towards immigrants by a multi-item instrument, which would enable a more reliable assessment of the attitude towards immigrants. Additionally, the way these attitudes are measured indicates the possibility of facilitating the immigrant threat in general, but not concretely, in terms of realistic or symbolic threat. The research generally shows that people react differently depending on which type of threat is concerned (see, e.g., Schmuck, Matthes, 2015). Finally, we noted earlier that this research is conducted in Serbia, which implies several limitations, or, more specifically, differences in regard to the many other European countries: official policy toward immigrants is more humanistic, extreme right-wing parties are less influential in the society and less focused to the immigration issues. All of these could be the reasons for assumption that stronger effects could be detected on the samples from some European countries, primarily the countries that are characterized with the restrictive policies toward immigrants.

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APPENDIX: LATENT STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Table A1

*Latent structure of the evaluations of political parties: rotated components in
 two-dimensional space*

	Socio-Liberal Parties	National-Conservative Parties
Liberal-Democratic Party	,95	
League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina	,87	
Democratic Party	,79	
Social-Democratic Party	,78	
New Party	,72	
United Regions of Serbia	,60	
Civic Movement "It's Enough!"	,57	
Socialdemocratic Party of Serbia	,56	
Serbian Renewal Movement	,45	,41
The Serbian Movement Dveri		,90
Serbian Radical Party		,89
Democratic Party of Serbia		,69
New Serbia		,67
Serbian Progressive Party		,64
Unified Serbia		,63
Socialistic Party of Serbia		,58
Party of United Pensioners of Serbia	,40	,49
λ	9.07	53.4
% of explained variance	1.66	9.8
r	.72	

Notes: λ – eigenvalue; r – zero-order correlations between extracted components

RELACIJE IZMEĐU RADIKALNIH UVERENJA I STAVOVA PREMA IMIGRANTIMA: MEDIJATORSKA ULOGA EVALUACIJE POLITIČKIH STRANAKA

Ovo istraživanje imalo je za cilj da ispita specifične odnose između radikalnih uverenja (operacionalizovanih kroz Militantno-ekstremistički mentalni sklop - MEM), evaluacije različitih političkih partija u Srbiji i negativnih stava prema imigrantima. Pretpostavili smo da će se registrovati pozitivne relacije sva tri aspekta MEMa (Apologija nasilja, Zli svet i Sveti cilj), i pozitivne evaluacije konzervativnih partija sa negativnim stavom prema imigrantima, i negativan odnos pozitivne evaluacije liberalnih partija i anti-imigracijskog stava. Takođe smo očekivali da odnosi između radikalnih uverenja i negativnog stava prema imigrantima budu posredovani evaluacijama političkih stranaka. Uzorak je uključio 486 ispitanika. Očekivane relacije MEM aspekata i pozitivnih evaluacija i konzervativnih i liberalnih političkih partija sa negativnim stavom prema imigrantima su detektovane. Pored toga, rezultati su pokazali da Apologija nasilja i Sveti cilj imaju direktne putanje ka anti-imigracijskom stavu, dok su efekti sva tri aspekta MEMa uz to i posredovani evaluacijama političkih stranaka, pre svega liberalnih. Pozitivno evaluiranje konzervativnih partija povećava, dok pozitivno evaluiranje liberalnih partija umanjuje efekte radikalnih uverenja na stavove prema imigrantima. rezultati istraživanja doprinose razumevanju reakcija domicilnog stanovništva u Srbiji na imigrante, i, sledstveno, predstavljaju relevantne informacije koje treba da se uzmu u obzir kada se kreiraju nacionalne i lokalne politike prema imigrantima.

KLJUČNE REČI: stavovi prema imigrantima / Militantno-ekstremistički mentalni sklop / političke stranke / konzervativizam / liberalizam