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CONTEXTUAL AND ATTITUDINAL DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS*

Boban Petrović*

Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade

Immigrant issues and relations with them have been updated in recent years due to a large number of immigrants from the Middle East and Africa on the road to European Union countries. The attitudes of citizens of Serbia and other countries in Europe towards immigrants range from acceptance to extremely negative attitudes and violent behavior towards them. Such a situation indicates that the issue of Serbian citizens' attitudes towards immigrants is important from the standpoint of safety. Therefore, this study has focused on determinants of attitudes of Serbian citizens towards immigrants. Determinants of the contextual level, primarily economic security and life in a multiethnic environment, as well as from the individual: social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, nationalism, and religiosity, were investigated. The research was conducted on a sample of 540 respondents from the general Serbian population, and data were collected online. The results showed that economic security has no direct effect on a prosocial attitude towards immigrants, while a multiethnic environment, contrary to expectations, has a negative effect. In line with previous research, attitudinal dimensions also have a negative effect, especially social dominance orientation, but also nationalism and religiosity. It is especially important to emphasize that two significant interactions are detected. They show that, in contrast to individuals who are neither religious nor nationalistic, those who are more religious and with more pronounced nationalistic attitudes

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* E-mail: boban.petrovic@iksi.ac.rs, bobanpetrovi@gmail.com

express negative attitudes towards immigrants if they originate from multiethnic backgrounds. These findings are consistent with the cultural threat hypothesis.

KEYWORDS: attitudes towards immigrants / social attitudes / economic security / multiethnicity

1. INTRODUCTION

During recent years, a growing number of immigrants, mainly from the Middle East and North African countries, moved through Serbia in transition toward Western Europe via the Western Balkan route. This trend is not new - it has intensified since the beginning of the outbreak of unrest in the Middle Eastern and North African countries, starting from 2008 (Denda, 2014). This emerging trend culminated in 2015, when 577,995 people, mostly from the Middle East, passed through Serbia; which is 35 times more than in the previous year, when 16,490 immigrants were registered (Petrović, 2016). The most numerous people are from Syria, Eritrea, Somalia, and Afghanistan, but also from other countries (Lukić, 2016). They are dominantly males, Muslims, with lower levels of education and economic status (it should be noted here that in last few years the number of immigrants with a higher level of education has increased (Denda, 2014)). Despite the large number of people who express their intention to seek asylum in Serbia increasing from year to year, the proportion of submitted claims is very small - the people mainly tend to pass through Serbia toward some of the Western European countries (Lukić, 2016). The responses of the European states were diverse, including the fact that even some of the Member States of the European Union took very restrictive steps and created a restrictive policy to prevent the entry of illegal migrants. It is significant to point out that even a few years ago, slightly before the emergence of the crisis and increase of rates of migration especially from Middle Eastern and North African countries to Europe, in the countries of Western and Eastern Europe as well as in Serbia, immigrants were seen as one of the most unpopular social groups (Todosijević, 2018).

On the State level, Serbia based its approach toward immigrants on respecting humanitarian and European values, organizing the admission and transfer of immigrants to the EU countries and cooperating with other countries from the Western Balkan route, as well as the European Union and some of the EU member states (Tatalović & Malnar, 2016). When Slovenia and Croatia interrupted the admission of economic migrants, Serbia closed its own borders, highlighting security issues. However, Serbia continued with a humanitarian approach toward illegal immigrants, without elements of their securitization (Tatalović & Malnar, 2016).

Nevertheless, with the migrant crisis and the increasing number of migrants many security issues have opened, both in Serbia and in other countries, because it turns out that many countries are not prepared to respond effectively to security risks that

emerged with the migrant crisis. When talking about the security risks associated with the migrant crisis, it can be pointed out that there are risks to the safety of citizens, states, and the international environment, as well as risks to the safety of the immigrants themselves, which cover all spheres of human security (Mijalković & Petrović, 2016). In this context, it must be noted that with the growing influx of immigrants passing through Serbia on its path towards the European Union, the attitude of citizens of Serbia and other countries in Europe towards immigrants varied from acceptance and providing assistance to extremely negative attitudes and even violent behaviors towards immigrants (Ceobanu & Excandell, 2010; Bobić, 2013; Denda, 2014).

Some data (e.g., Denda, 2014) showed that over a longer period of time, the citizens of Serbia had relatively positive attitudes toward immigrants, which originated mainly from the Eastern European countries. But from 2010 with an increasing number of immigrants from the Middle Eastern and North African countries, the attitudes toward them became more negative, especially in the places where asylum centers are situated. Local people organized a series of activities directed against immigrants: protests (justified by beliefs that asylum seekers were armed with knives, that they will attack local girls, that children are afraid and may not go to school), stoning the houses in which asylum seekers have stayed with the justification that they rob and steal, burning barracks in which asylum seekers stayed, etc. But, official data showed that only a few minor offenses were committed by immigrants - the largest numbers of reported offenses were the violent acts of the natives against immigrants (Denda, 2014). It is also interesting that in places without asylum centers, thus, with reduced possibility of contact with immigrants, negative stereotypes prevailed (Denda, 2014).

A negative perception, and attitudes and readiness to show violence toward immigrants (and any other outgroups) are often explained by hypotheses about immigrants as an economic and/or cultural threat. According to these hypotheses, immigrants could be perceived as a realistic or symbolic threat to the local people's economic security (economic threat) and cultural norms and standards as well as their social identity, i.e., cultural threat (Dinesen, Klømmensen, & Nørgaard, 2014). In this sense, a number of studies are often focused on different economic factors, as well as issues of multiculturalism.

Attitudes towards immigrants may be associated with indicators of economic status at the individual level as well as at the level of the group (country, nation) as a whole (Dinesen, et al., 2014). However, findings from different studies are not consistent when it comes to the impact of economic factors on attitudes toward immigrants, such as income and employment status; while some studies show that there are such effects, others have found that there are no effects (e.g., Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010), especially in the countries of Eastern Europe. Also, the macro-economic factors (higher unemployment rate, increase in unemployment rate, more deprived economic environment, and similar) increase the chances that members of the domicile group will exert a negative attitude towards immigrants (Ceobanu & Excandell, 2010). But there are also data about the opposite effects - for example,

that the low employment rate among the resident population is related with less pronounced negative attitudes towards immigrants (Markaki & Longhi, 2013).

In the context of hypotheses about cultural threats, there is an increasing number of studies which investigate the role of multiculturalism in the formation of national identity and relations with other groups. Research has shown that life in multicultural environments and increased possibility of contact with the out-groups could be reflected on the dominant domicile group as a threat to their national identity (which implies a negative attitude towards out-groups), as well as a context that is conducive to reducing prejudice (Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010). Of course, in this context it is important to bear in mind not only the presence of minority groups but also their size and visibility, which may be associated with greater experience of threats by the out-groups. However, some research showed that the size of the minority (and immigrant) groups in fact suppressed the experience of the threat because it increases the possibility of intergroup contact (Ceobanu & Excandell, 2010).

Besides the contextual factors which could determine stereotypes and attitudes toward some specific social group, including immigrants, there is growing empirical evidence that factors from the individual level, personality traits (Petrović, 2016), or, even more, social attitudes (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007) are very important determinants of the prejudices toward outgroups. Previous research showed that there are three distinct dimensions of generalized prejudices toward three different groups: "dangerous", "dissident" and "derogated" groups - immigrants belong to this last group (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). While attitudes toward "dangerous" groups are linked only with right-wing authoritarianism, attitudes toward "derogated" groups, including immigrants, are associated with the social dominance orientation (Danso, Sedlovskaya, & Suanda, 2007; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008; Asbrock, Sibley & Duckitt, 2010; Ho, Sidanius, Pratto, Levin, Thomsen, Kteily, & Sheehy-Skeffington, 2012; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014). It is interesting that these relationships are reflected at the level of the broader social process - it has been shown that the social dominance orientation is positively associated with the advocacy of adopting more stringent immigration laws independently of the countries and cultures, while right-wing authoritarianism is associated with the adoption of strict laws against immigrants, but only in their own country (Craig & Richeson, 2014). Although the role of social dominance orientation is dominant when it comes to prejudice against immigrants, other social attitudes also play an important role, in particular: authoritarianism (Bello, 2015; Dinesen, Klemmensen, & Norgaard, 2016), ethnocentrism (Valentino, Brader & Jadina, 2012), nationalism (Louis, Esses, & Lalonde, 2013; Breznau & Danielson, 2014), conservatism (Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Župarić-Iljić & Gregurović, 2013; Breznau & Danielson, 2014; Bello, 2015; Jaime-Castillo, Marqués-Perales, & Álvarez-Gálvez, 2015; Dinesen, et al., 2016; Gallego, in press) and religiosity (Župarić-Iljić & Gregurović, 2013). It is interesting that several studies have registered a negative relation of religion and prejudice against immigrants (Bello, 2015; Jaime-Castillo et al., 2015) - it can be said that, when it comes to religiosity, the results are not

unambiguous. Previously, the independent contribution of contextual and attitudinal factors in understanding the attitudes toward immigrants was discussed. But, it must be noted that individual attitudes and behavior, including prejudices and attitudes toward immigrants, are supposed to be influenced by both attitudinal and situational factors, as well as their interactions - situational factors could moderate the relationship between basic attitudinal dimensions and attitudes toward immigrants (Ackermann & Ackermann, 2015). As previous research suggested, economic deprivation and ethnic diversity are supposed to be a relevant contextual factors which could have a moderating role in regard to the relationship between basic social attitudes and attitudes toward immigrants (Ackermann & Ackermann, 2015; Ceobanu & Escandell 2008; Markaki & Longhi 2013).

2. THE CURRENT STUDY

The presence of immigrants, even if they are only passing through a transit country (in this case, Serbia), due to the reason of their perception from the domiciles as sources of possible threat to economic and/or cultural status and heritages, implies a twofold security risk: for the domicile population, but also for immigrants themselves. In this sense, it is important to understand which factors from the individual (attitudinal) and contextual level (economic deprivation, ethnic diversity) determined attitudes toward immigrants, and also what the implications of relations between them for security issues are. Bearing in mind that a large number of immigrants originate from a cultural background significantly different than Serbian (which is probably perceived as derogated by domiciles) passed through Serbia in the last few years and that they intended to enter Western European countries as their final destination, it could be hypothesized that domicile people could perceive them as a cultural threat rather than an economic one, despite their relatively low economic status. In this sense, mechanisms of protection of cultural norms, national and religious identity could be activated, and it could be expected that relations between multi-ethnicity (positive) and attitudinal dimensions (negative) on one side and positive attitudes toward immigrants on the other should be stronger than relations between economic factors and attitudes toward immigrants. As noted above, contextual factors might moderate the associations between social attitudes and attitudes toward immigrants. Following previous findings, it could be expected that primarily multi-ethnicity would moderate the relationship between attitudinal mechanisms of protection of cultural norms (nationalism and religiosity) and attitudes toward immigrants.

3. METHOD

3.1. Sample and procedure

There were 540 respondents in this study. The average age of the participants was 24 years (SD=6.04), with 24% of participants being male. Average education was 14 years of formal education (SD=3.29). Almost all of the participants (99%) were of Serbian nationality. Data was collected via on-line study. No missing values were detected. Participants were motivated to participate by the possibility to receive feedback regarding their results on the administrated questionnaires, an opportunity which most of them used.

3.2. Measures

3.2.1. Measures of social attitudes

Positive attitude toward immigrants was measured through the item "In your opinion, to what extent should Serbia allow people from other countries, regardless of skin color, nationality or country of origin to immigrate, live and work in Serbia?". Participants rated the item on a 5-point scale (1 = *Do not allow anyone*, 5 = *Allow all who want to come, live and work here*).

Social Dominance Orientation was measured by a short, 10-item version of the SDO questionnaire (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Todosijević, 2013). Five items indicate a favorable orientation toward group dominance and inequality (Dominance), and 5 reverse-coded items indicate a favorable orientation toward social equality (Egalitarianism). Participants rated items on a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*). In this research we used only the SDO Dominance scale.

RWA was measured by the 36 items of the ACT scale (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010). Three aspects of the RWA, Conservatism, Traditionalism and Authoritarianism were each measured by twelve of these items. Participants indicated their responses using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Nationalism was operationalized through the Nationalistic Orientation scale (Todosijević, 2013), a one-dimensional scale of nationalistic attitude. It contains 11 items. Participants were asked for their agreement (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*) with the statements.

Religiosity was measured by the R scale from Arizona Life History Battery (Figueredo, Vásquez, Brumbach, & Schneider, 2007; available at <http://www.u.arizona.edu/~ajf/alhb.html>). Initially, this scale consisted of 17 items, but four items were eliminated due to redundancy and difficulties in adaptation of the items to the cultural conditions in Serbia. The final version of the R scale consisted of 13 items,

which were rated by participants on a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*).

3.2.2. Contextual variables

Average household income was expressed as a response to the question "What is the average monthly income of your family (when income from all sources in the family is added up and divided by the number of family members)?" Average values were 56,038.32 (SD = 56,581.53, Min = 0.00, Max = 360,000.00)

Size of the place of residence was defined on the basis of data on the total population of each of the places of residence of the respondents, according to the census of the Republic of Serbia, performed in 2011-the year (http://popis2011.stat.rs/?page_id=2162).

Level of economic development of the place of residence was defined according to the criteria of achieving a value of gross domestic product below/above the national average GDP value. The places of residence of the respondents were classified into 4 categories, from developed (1st category) to underdeveloped (4th category), according to the Decree on establishing a unified list of regional development and local government units for 2014 (Sl. Glasnik RS, 104/2014 from the October 2014).

Multi-ethnicity of the environment where the respondents live was operationalized as a composite of two variables. Both of them were defined on the basis of data from the census of 2011. Since the census data show that in the majority of cities in Serbia the population is predominantly of Serbian nationality, the first indicator (variable) of multi-ethnicity is defined as a percentage of the minority population in a given place. Another indicator is the number of different ethnicities that make up more than 0.5% of the total population of a given city.

4. RESULTS

Bivariate correlations between contextual and attitudinal variables are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, people with a lower economic standard originated from smaller and economically underdeveloped places of residence. Multi-ethnicity was not associated with indicators of personal and contextual economic standard, but it was related negatively with the size of the respondents' places of residence. As expected, four attitudinal dimensions, SDO Dominance, authoritarianism, nationalism and religiosity, correlated positively.

Very interesting are the correlations between attitudinal and situational variables - namely, attitudinal variables, all except SDO Dominance correlated negatively with size of the places of residence and positively with the level of economic development of the places of residence - practically, people who are more authoritarian, nationalistic and religious originated from smaller and more economically undeveloped places of residence. Attitudinal dimensions and the indicator of personal economic standard and multi-ethnicity do not correlate.

Table 1. Bivariate correlations of predictor variables

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
|---|--------|--------|-------|-----|-------|-------|-------|---|
| 1 Average household income | 1 | | | | | | | |
| 2 Size of the place of residence (population) | .19** | 1 | | | | | | |
| 3 Level of economic development | -.14** | -.51** | 1 | | | | | |
| 4 Multi-ethnicity | -.01 | -.31** | .07 | 1 | | | | |
| 5 SDO Dominance | -.03 | -.04 | .08 | .08 | 1 | | | |
| 6 RWA | -.08 | -.19** | .10* | .08 | .36** | 1 | | |
| 7 Nationalism | -.08 | -.14** | .11* | .03 | .33** | .65** | 1 | |
| 8 Religiosity | -.11* | -.17** | .13** | .04 | .19** | .59** | .59** | 1 |

Notes: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

In order to explore the specific contribution of contextual and attitudinal variables to understanding positive attitudes toward immigrants, a hierarchical regression model was set. Situational variables were entered at the first level and attitudinal variables at the second level of the hierarchical regression analysis. The gender, age and years of education of participants were also included in the model because its variance needed to be controlled in the analysis. Results of the hierarchical regression analysis are presented in Table 2.

Results of the regression analysis show that contextual factors explained only 5% of variance of the criterion measure, and that only multi-ethnicity (with a negative sign) is a significant predictor of attitudes toward immigrants - natives from the major ethnic group who live in an ethnically heterogeneous environment tend to express negative attitudes toward immigrants. But, the contribution of multi-ethnicity becomes insignificant when attitudinal variables are entered in the regression model at the second level of analysis. Attitudinal dimensions explained an additional 18% of variance of the criteria, above and beyond contextual variables. As can be seen, all of them are in negative relations with positive attitudes toward immigrants, with SDO Dominance as the best predictor. Right-wing authoritarianism, despite significant (negative) zero-order correlation with criteria, did not have significant predictive power.

Table 2. Characteristics of regression models

| | β_1 | β_2 | r |
|--|----------------|-----------|--------|
| Gender | .12* | .05 | .10* |
| Age | .09 | .03 | .09 |
| Education | .05 | .01 | .06 |
| Average household income | .07 | .05 | .09 |
| Size of the place of residence (population) | .03 | .00 | .07 |
| Level of economic development of the place of living | .01 | .06 | -.02 |
| Multi-ethnicity | -.13* | -.08 | -.11* |
| SDO Dominance | | -.31** | -.39** |
| RWA | | .03 | -.27** |
| Nationalism | | -.13* | -.32** |
| Religiosity | | -.16** | -.29** |
| | R ² | .05** | .23** |
| | ΔR^2 | | .18** |

Notes: β_1 -standardized regression coefficient on the first level of analysis; β_2 -standardized regression coefficient on the second level of analysis; r-zero order correlation between predictor and criterion; R²-percentage of criterion's explained variance; ΔR^2 -increment in the percentage of criterion's explained variance after adding the variables on the second level; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

In order to explore the possible moderating role of contextual factors in the relationship between social attitudes and attitudes toward immigrants, interactions between contextual and attitudinal variables were calculated, following the procedure described by Međedović (2013) and Dawson (2014). Two significant interaction effects were detected. In both cases, multi-ethnicity moderates the relationship between nationalism ($\beta=-.48$, $r=-.23$, $\Delta R^2=0.1$, $F=5.220$, $p<.05$) and religiosity ($\beta=-.276$, $r=-.255$, $\Delta R^2=0.1$, $F=4.221$, $p<.05$). As can be seen on Figure 1, people who scored higher on nationalism and lived in a multi-ethnic environment expressed more negative attitudes toward immigrants than nationalists from an ethnically more homogenous environment, as well as people who scored lower on nationalism.




Figure 1. Moderator effect of Multi-ethnicity on the relationship between Nationalism and attitudes toward immigrants

Similarly, religious people from an ethnically more heterogeneous environment displayed more negative attitudes toward immigrants in comparison with religious people from an ethnically more homogenous environment and nonreligious people (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Moderator effect of Multi-ethnicity on the relationship between Religiosity and attitudes toward immigrants

It is important to note that basic effect sizes of multiethnicity ($\beta=.35$, $p>.05$, i.e., $\beta=.14$, $p>.05$) and both Nationalism ($\beta=-.05$, $p>.05$) and Religiosity ($\beta=-.02$, $p>.05$) became insignificant when their interactions were entered in the regression models.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Immigrants, mainly from a different cultural background than Serbian, which increasingly passed through Serbia in transition toward Western Europe, and reactions of the governments, as well as domicile people toward them, provoke a number of questions important from the perspective of national security. There are few studies which have described the actual situation and position of the immigrants in transit or the host countries, (Bobić, 2013, Denda, 2014, Lukić, 2016) or analyzed some of the security issues linked with the migration crisis on a state level (Mijalković & Petrović, 2016; Tatalović & Malnar, 2016), not only in a Serbian context. Also, there are researches which are focused on contextual (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Markaki & Longhi, 2013) or attitudinal determinants (Jaime-Castillo et al., 2015; Louis, Esses, & Lalonde, 2013) of attitudes toward immigrants. But, studies which take into account both cultural and attitudinal factors, and which are focused on their interactions in an attempt to understand attitudes toward immigrants, especially in the context of security issues, are relatively rare.

This research aimed to explore the specific contribution of both contextual and attitudinal factors in understanding positive attitudes toward immigrants. In this sense, specifically the roles of economic deprivation and ethnic diversity as contextual factors and social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, nationalism

and religiosity as attitudinal factors, as well as effects of their possible interactions in the explanation of attitudes toward immigrants were explored.

This research is not focused primarily on the security issues of the migrant crisis in Serbia (as noted above, on the state level, the Serbian government took a humanitarian approach toward immigrants, without their securitization (Tatalović & Malnar, 2016); however, following the report of Denda (2014), reactions of the citizens toward immigrants, especially in the places where asylum centers were situated, suggested that security issues are very relevant in this context). But, the results of this study might have some important implications for the security of both domiciles and immigrants. As expected, the results of this study showed that attitudinal factors are more powerful predictors of attitudes toward immigrants than contextual factors. But, contextual factors, more concretely, ethnic diversity in the place of residence of the respondents, explained a small but significant percentage of variance of the attitudes toward immigrants, while factors of economic deprivation had no significant effects. These results are in line with previous studies which showed that the experience of the threat to cultural norms and identities leads to the much more pronounced negative attitudes toward immigrants than the experience of the threat to economic interests (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Schneider, 2008). However, contrary to some previous findings (Ackermann & Ackermann, 2015) about the positive relations of living in an ethnically diverse environment and positive attitudes toward immigrants, this study resulted with a negative link between these two variables. One of the reasons for this finding could be the structure of the sample - almost all respondents are of Serbian ethnicity. But, there are a few more reasons, which followed from these findings that are of great importance - people who are more religious and who express nationalistic attitudes will have negative attitudes toward immigrants, especially if they originated from an ethnically heterogeneous environment. These findings are in accordance with the growing amount of empirical evidence that nationalistic (Louis, et al., 2013) and ethnocentric (Valentino, et al., 2013) attitudes, as well as religiosity (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011; Župarić-Iljić & Gregurović, 2013) are linked with negative attitudes toward immigrants. The findings are also in line with research which showed that, for the domicile dominant ethnic group (in this case, Serbian people) life in multi-cultural environments and increased possibility of contact with the out-groups could be reflected on the dominant domicile group as a threat to their national identity (Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010). Finally, it is important to note that social dominance orientation is a more important predictor of attitudes toward immigrants - this finding also has great empirical support (Ho, et al., 2012), and it suggests that immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa could be perceived as a derogated group by the domicile people (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007).

In this context, these findings could be interpreted in accordance with the hypothesis about immigrants as a cultural threat: with the advent of people from a different, probably derogated cultural background, people with higher religious and nationalistic sentiments will be ready to express negative attitudes toward immigrants, and probably to advocate and realize violent acts against them. Bearing

in mind that some domiciles could express a broad range of negative attitudes and violent acts toward immigrants (from protests to the burning of barracks in which asylum seekers stayed (Denda, 2014)), it is important to note that the potential perpetrators of the violent acts against immigrants could be recruited from the people who are more religious, and nationalists. Following these findings, it is possible to create interventions and educational programs which could be directed toward the reduction of prejudices, negative attitudes and readiness to enact violence against immigrants, and, therefore, toward the increase of the security both of domiciles and immigrants in Serbia.

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KONTEKSTUALNE I STAVOVSKJE DETERMINANTE ODNOSA PREMA IMIGRANTIMA: BEZBEDNOSNE IMPLIKACIJE

Pitanja imigranata i odnosa prema njima poslednjih godina se aktuelizuju usled velikog broja imigranata sa Bliskog istoka i Afrike na putu ka zemljama Evropske unije. Odnos prema imigrantima građana Srbije, ali i drugih zemalja u Evropi, varira od prihvatanja do izrazito negativnih stavova i nasilnog ponašanja prema njima. Takvo stanje indikuje da je pitanje stavova građana Srbije prema imigrantima važno i sa stanovišta bezbednosti. Upravo stoga, ovo istraživanje usmereno je na utvrđivanje determinanti stavova građana Srbije prema imigrantima. Ispitivane su determinante sa kontekstualnog nivoa, pre svega ekonomska sigurnost i život u multietničkoj sredini, kao i sa individualnog: orijentacija na društvenu dominaciju, desničarska autoritarnost, nacionalizam i religioznost. Istraživanje je realizovano na prigodnom uzorku od 540 ispitanika iz opšte populacije Srbije, a podaci su prikupljeni on-line. Rezultati su pokazali da ekonomska sigurnost nema direktan efekat na prosocijalni odnos prema imigrantima, dok multietničnost sredine, suprotno očekivanjima, ima negativan efekat. U skladu sa ranijim istraživanjima, stavovske dimenzije takođe imaju negativan efekat, pre svega orijentacija na socijalnu dominaciju, ali i nacionalizam i religioznost. Posebno je važno istaći da su detektovane i dve značajne interakcije. One pokazuju da, za razliku od pojedinaca koji nisu ni religiozni ni nacionalistički orijentisani, oni koji su religiozniji i sa izraženijim nacionalističkim stavovima ispoljavaju negativnije stavove prema imigrantima ukoliko potiču iz multietničkih sredina. Ovi nalazi su u skladu sa hipotezom o kulturološkoj pretnji.

KLJUČNE REČI: stavovi prema imigrantima / socijalni stavovi / ekonomska sigurnost / multietničnost